# Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton > Supreme Court of the United States · June 26, 1995 · 515 U.S. 646 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433199 ## Case - **Full name:** VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J v. ACTON Et Ux., Guardians Ad Litem for ACTON - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 26, 1995 - **Citations:** 515 U.S. 646; 115 S. Ct. 2386; 132 L. Ed. 2d 564; 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4275 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Ginsburg - **Judges:** Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, O'Connor, Stevens, Souter - **Cited by:** 1,237 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433199 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that the reasonableness standard applies in public schools because traditional Fourth Amendment requirements “would unduly interfere with the maintenance of . . . swift and informal disciplinary procedures” and “would undercut the substantial need of teachers and ad… - explaining that the Supreme Court reserves the question on whether a school district could impose mandatory testing on all students and noting that “[t]he Court constantly observes that the School District’s drug-testing policy applies only to students who voluntarily particip… - explaining that “unemancipated minors ... are subject, even as to their physical freedom, to the control of their parents or guardians,” such that when those children are in school, “the teachers and administrators of those schools stand in loco parentis over the children entr… - explaining that, although “reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant,” “a warrant is not required to establish the rea- sonableness of all government searches; and when a warrant is not required . . . , probable cause is not invariably required either” - stating that “[s]chool sports are not for the bashful” and “there is ‘an element of “communal undress” inherent in athletic participation’ ” (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe Cty. Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988)), amended by Schaill, 864 F.2d 1309 (1989) ## Opinion text Justice Ginsburg, concurring. The Court constantly observes that the School District’s drug-testing policy applies only to students who voluntarily participate in interscholastic athletics. Ante, at 650,657 (reduced privacy expectation and closer school regulation of student athletes), 662 (drug use by athletes risks immediate physical harm to users and those with whom they play). Correspondingly, the most severe sanction allowed under the District’s policy is suspension from extracurricular athletic programs. Ante, at 651. I comprehend the Court’s opinion as reserving the question whether the District, on no more than the showing made here, constitutionally could impose routine drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in team sports, but on all students required to attend school. Cf. United States v. Edwards, 498 F. 2d 496, 500 (CA2 1974) (Friendly, J.) (in contrast to search without notice and opportunity to avoid examination, airport search of passengers and luggage is avoidable “by choosing not to travel by air”) (internal quotation marks omitted). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433199. Public record. Not legal advice.