# Kyles v. Whitley > Supreme Court of the United States · April 19, 1995 · 514 U.S. 419 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433121 ## Case - **Full name:** Kyles v. Whitley, Warden - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** April 19, 1995 - **Citations:** 514 U.S. 419; 115 S. Ct. 1555; 131 L. Ed. 2d 490; 1995 U.S. LEXIS 2845 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stevens - **Judges:** Souter, Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas - **Cited by:** 5,388 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Disagreed with by State ex rel. Z.W., 408 N.J. Super. 535 (2009). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 3 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433121 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that “the showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal”; rather, “Bagley’s touchstone of materiality is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a di… - holding that in determining whether there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome resulting from the prosecution’s suppression of Brady material, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evide… - recognizing that, "regardless of request, favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, `if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would hav… - holding “a showing of materiality does not require demonstration by [even] a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal”; rather, withheld evidence is material if, in its absence, the defendant did not r… - recognizing that, "regardless of request, favor- able evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would h… ## Opinion text Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, concurring. As the Court has explained, this case presents an important legal issue. See ante, at 440-441. Because Justice *455 Scalia so emphatically disagrees, I add this brief response to his criticism of the Court’s decision to grant certiorari. Proper management of our certiorari docket, as Justice Scalia notes, see post, at 456-460, precludes us from hearing argument on the merits of even a “substantial percentage” of the capital cases that confront us. Compare Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U. S. 949 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari), with id., at 956 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even aside from its legal importance, however, this case merits “favored treatment,” cf. post, at 457, for at least three reasons. First, the fact that the jury was unable to reach a verdict at the conclusion of the first trial provides strong reason to believe the significant errors that occurred at the second trial were prejudicial. Second, cases in which the record reveals so many instances of the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence are extremely rare. Even if I shared Justice Scalia’s appraisal of the evidence in this case — which I do not — I would still believe we should independently review the record to ensure that the prosecution’s blatant and repeated violations of a well-settled constitutional obligation did not deprive petitioner of a fair trial. Third, despite my high regard for the diligence and craftsmanship of the author of the majority opinion in the Court of Appeals, my independent review of the case left me with the same degree of doubt about petitioner’s guilt expressed by the dissenting judge in that court. Our duty to administer justice occasionally requires busy judges to engage in a detailed review of the particular facts of a case, even though our labors may not provide posterity with a newly minted rule of law. The current popularity of capital punishment makes this “generalizable principle,” post, at 460, especially important. Cf. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U. S. 504, 519-520 , and n. 5 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). I wish such review were unnecessary, but I cannot agree that our position in the judicial hierarchy makes it inappropriate. Sometimes the performance of an unpleasant *456 duty conveys a message more significant than even the most penetrating legal analysis. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433121. Public record. Not legal advice.