# Johnson v. De Grandy > Supreme Court of the United States · June 30, 1994 · 512 U.S. 997 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433062 ## Case - **Full name:** JOHNSON, SPEAKER OF THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Et Al. v. DE GRANDY Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 30, 1994 - **Citations:** 512 U.S. 997; 114 S. Ct. 2647; 129 L. Ed. 2d 775; 1994 U.S. LEXIS 5082 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by O'Connor - **Judges:** Souter, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, Iii-B-, Kennedy, Thomas, Scalia - **Cited by:** 1,044 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433062 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining in the context of § 2 that although "society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity, that should not obscure the fact that there are communities in which minority citizens a… - explaining in the context of §2 that although “society’s racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity, that should not obscure the fact that there are communities in which minority citizens ar… - explaining that " 'Proportionality' as the term is used here links the number of majority-minority voting districts to minority members' share of the relevant population," which is consistent with the VRA's requirement that "the ultimate right of § 2 is equality of opportunity… - stating that under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, “a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates … - explaining that Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine bars a party losing in state court from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the… ## Opinion text *1025 Justice O’Connor, concurring. The critical issue in these cases is whether § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 , requires courts to “maximize” the number of districts in which minority voters may elect their candidates of choice. The District Court, applying the maximization principle, operated “on the apparent assumption that what could have been done to create additional Hispanic supermajority districts should have been done.” Ante, at 1009. The Court today makes clear that the District Court was in error, and that the Voting Rights Act does not require maximization. Ante, at 1017 (“Failure to maximize cannot be the measure of § 2”); ante, at 1022 (the District Court improperly “equated dilution with failure to maximize the number of reasonably compact majority-minority districts”). But today’s opinion does more than reject the maximization principle. The opinion’s central teaching is that proportionality — defined as the relationship between the number of majority-minority voting districts and the minority group’s share of the relevant population — is always relevant evidence in determining vote dilution, but is never itself dispositive. Lack of proportionality is probative evidence of vote dilution. “[A]ny theory of vote dilution must necessarily rely to some extent on a measure of minority voting strength that makes some reference to the proportion between the minority group and the electorate at large.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 84 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, in evaluating the Gingles preconditions and the totality of the circumstances a court must always consider the relationship between the number of majority-minority voting districts and the minority group’s share of the population. Cf. id., at 99 (“[T]he relative lack of minority electoral success under a challenged plan, when compared with the success that would be predicted under the measure of undiluted minority voting strength the court is employing, can constitute powerful evidence of vote dilution”). *1026 The Court also makes clear that proportionality is never dispositive. Lack of proportionality can never by itself prove dilution, for courts must always carefully and searchingly review the totality of the circumstances, including the extent to which minority groups have access to the political process. Ante, at 1011-1012. Nor does the presence of proportionality prove the absence of dilution. Proportionality is not a safe harbor for States; it does not immunize their election schemes from §2 challenge. Ante, at 1017-1021. In sum, the Court’s carefully crafted approach treats proportionality as relevant evidence, but does not make it the only relevant evidence. In doing this the Court makes clear that §2 does not require maximization of minority voting strength, yet remains faithful to § 2’s command that minority voters be given equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. With this understanding, I join the opinion of the Court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433062. Public record. Not legal advice.