# Romano v. Oklahoma

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 13, 1994 · 512 U.S. 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433003

## Case

- **Full name:** Romano v. Oklahoma
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 13, 1994
- **Citations:** 512 U.S. 1; 114 S. Ct. 2004; 129 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4585
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Blackmun
- **Judges:** Rehnquist, O'Con-Nor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, O'Connor, Blackmun, Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter
- **Cited by:** 476 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433003

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the introduction of evidence concerning a previously imposed death sentence did not mislead the jury on its sentencing role because, among other reasons, “[t]he jury was instructed that it had the responsibility for determining whether the death penalty should be …
- stating that “civil contempt sanctions, 7 or those penalties designed to compel future compliance with a court order, are considered 8 to be coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary 9 civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be…
- holding that admission of evidence regarding the defendant’s prior -109- STATE V. GILLARD Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part death sentence in a separate and unrelated trial did not “so infect[ ] the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury…
- concluding that the admission of irrelevant evidence did not “so infect the . . . proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury’s [verdict] a 18 denial of due process” where even without the improper evidence “the jury had sufficient evidence to justify its conclusion”
- holding that a limiting instruction by the trial court precluded a finding that improperly admitted evidence “so infected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury’s imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process”

## Opinion text

Justice Blackmun,
dissenting.
I join Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which persuasively demonstrates why the admission of Romano’s prior death sentence, like the prosecutor’s arguments in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985), created an unacceptable risk of leading the jurors to minimize the importance of their roles. Even if this particular constitutional error were not present in this case, I would vacate Romano’s death sentence and remand for resentencing in adherence to my view that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of our Constitution. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U. S. 1141, 1143 (1994).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433003. Public record. Not legal advice.