# Romano v. Oklahoma

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 13, 1994 · 512 U.S. 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433002

## Case

- **Full name:** Romano v. Oklahoma
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 13, 1994
- **Citations:** 512 U.S. 1; 114 S. Ct. 2004; 129 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4585
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by O'Connor
- **Judges:** Rehnquist, O'Con-Nor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, O'Connor, Blackmun, Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter
- **Cited by:** 476 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433002

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the introduction of evidence concerning a previously imposed death sentence did not mislead the jury on its sentencing role because, among other reasons, “[t]he jury was instructed that it had the responsibility for determining whether the death penalty should be …
- stating that “civil contempt sanctions, 7 or those penalties designed to compel future compliance with a court order, are considered 8 to be coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary 9 civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be…
- holding that admission of evidence regarding the defendant’s prior -109- STATE V. GILLARD Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part death sentence in a separate and unrelated trial did not “so infect[ ] the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury…
- concluding that the admission of irrelevant evidence did not “so infect the . . . proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury’s [verdict] a 18 denial of due process” where even without the improper evidence “the jury had sufficient evidence to justify its conclusion”
- holding that a limiting instruction by the trial court precluded a finding that improperly admitted evidence “so infected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury’s imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process”

## Opinion text

Justice O’Connor,
concurring.
The Court today, relying in part on my opinion in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 341 (1985), rejects petitioner’s claim that the introduction of evidence of a prior death sentence impermissibly undermined the jury’s sense of responsibility. I write separately to explain why in my view petitioner’s Caldwell claim fails. The inaccuracy of the prosecutor’s argument in Caldwell was essential to my conclusion that the argument was unconstitutional. See id., at 342 (“[T]he prosecutor’s remarks were impermissible because they were inaccurate and misleading in a manner that diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility”). An accurate description of the jury’s role — even one that lessened the jury’s sense of responsibility — would have been constitutional. Ibid. (“[A] misleading picture of the jury’s role is not sanctioned by [California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992 (1983),] [b]ut neither does Ramos suggest that the Federal Constitution prohibits the giving of accurate instructions regarding postsentencing procedures”).
Accordingly, I believe that petitioner’s Caldwell claim fails because the evidence here was accurate at the time it was *15 admitted. Petitioner’s sentencing jury was told that he had been sentenced to death — and indeed he had been. Introducing that evidence is no different than providing the jury with an accurate description of a State’s appellate review process. Both may (though we can never know for sure) lessen the jury’s sense of responsibility, but neither is unconstitutional. Though evidence like that involved in this case can rise to the level of a Caldwell violation, to do so the evidence must be both inaccurate and tend to undermine the jury’s sense of responsibility. Ibid.
It may well have been better practice for the State to agree to accept petitioner’s stipulation offer, or to excise the sentencing information before submitting the Judgment and Sentence form to the jury. But under our precedents, because this evidence was accurate, I do not believe its introduction violated the Constitution.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433002. Public record. Not legal advice.