# Caspari v. Bohlen > Supreme Court of the United States · February 23, 1994 · 510 U.S. 383 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432940 ## Case - **Full name:** CASPARI, SUPERINTENDENT, MISSOURI EASTERN CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Et Al. v. BOHLEN - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** February 23, 1994 - **Citations:** 510 U.S. 383; 114 S. Ct. 948; 127 L. Ed. 2d 236; 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1868 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens - **Judges:** O'Connor, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Stevens - **Cited by:** 581 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432940 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that application of double jeopardy bar to successive noncapital sentencing would not be unfair and would enhance rather than hinder accuracy - finding it persuasive in determining that a rule advocated by the petitioner was new that two federal courts of appeals and several state courts of last resort had reached different conclusions on the issue, clearly suggesting that “reasonable jurists reviewing our precedents”… - holding that "[a] threshold question in every habeas case, therefore, is whether the court is obligated to apply the Teague rule to the defendant's claim" and that, "if the State does argue that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of constitutional law, the court mus… - holding that “a federal court may, but need not, decline to apply Teague if the State does not argue it,” but “if the State does argue that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of constitutional law, the court must apply Teague before considering the merits of the claim” - explaining that a state court conviction becomes "final” for Teague purposes when “the availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied” ## Opinion text Justice Stevens, dissenting. The nonretroactivity principle announced in the plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), is a judge-made defense that can be waived. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 41 (1990). In recent years, the Court has fashioned harsh rules regarding waiver and claim forfeiture to defeat substantial constitutional claims. See, e. g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478 (1986). If we are to apply such a strict approach to waiver in habeas corpus litigation, we should hold the warden to the same standard. Accordingly, given the treatment accorded the private litigant in Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27 (1993) (per curiam), I would hold that petitioner Caspari forfeited his Teague defense under this Court’s Rule 14.1(a). Distinguishing Izumi, the Court explains that the intervention question in that case was “wholly divorced from the question on which we granted review,” whereas here the Teague issue “is a necessary predicate to the resolution of the question presented in the petition.” Ante, at 389-390. Yet Izumi itself opened by acknowledging that it “would have to address” the intervention issue “[i]n order to reach the merits of this case.” 510 U. S., at 28 . It is no more “necessary” to answer the Teague question in this case than it was, for example, in Collins, supra. *398 On the merits, I agree with the Court of Appeals. Under Missouri law courts must make findings of fact that persistent-offender status is warranted for those convicted of certain offenses when the prosecutor establishes requisite facts by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. * That status subjects the defendant to more severe sentences, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.016.1 (Supp. 1982), and deprives him of the opportunity to have a jury sentence him, § 557.036.2. The sentence enhancement thus has the same legal effect as conviction of a separate offense; the separate sentencing hearing likewise is the practical equivalent of the trial. Missouri law acknowledges as much by properly requiring prosecutors to prove the factual predicate for the enhanced sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant opposing such an enhancement undoubtedly has a constitutional right to counsel and to the basic procedural protections the Due Process Clause affords. I have no hesitation in concluding that these protections include the right not to be “twice put in jeopardy” for the same offense. U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Mo. Rev. Stat. §658.021.1 (2) (Supp. 1982). A “persistent offender” had previously been adjudged guilty of two or more felonies committed at different times. § 558.016.3. Missouri also mandates an enhanced sentence if the prosecutor proves that the defendant is a “dangerous offender”— meaning one who is being sentenced for a felony during which he knowingly “murdered or endangered or threatened the life” of another, who “knowingly inflicted or attempted or threatened to inflict serious physical injury” on another, or who is guilty of certain felonies. §558.016.4. It is unfair to afford the prosecutor two opportunities to satisfy either provision. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432940. Public record. Not legal advice.