# Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. > Supreme Court of the United States · November 9, 1993 · 510 U.S. 17 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432904 ## Case - **Full name:** Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** November 9, 1993 - **Citations:** 510 U.S. 17; 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 655; 93 Daily Journal DAR 14212; 62 U.S.L.W. 4004; 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,623; 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8330; 114 S. Ct. 367; 126 L. Ed. 2d 295; 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7155 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Ginsburg - **Judges:** O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg - **Cited by:** 8,306 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled on other grounds by Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) — not on the Supreme Court's list. - Negative treatments: 2 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432904 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that in cases alleging discriminatory work environment, there “cannot be a mathematically precise test,” noting in concurrence that “the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment. ... It suffices to prove … - holding that in cases alleging discriminatory work environment, there cannot be a mathematically precise test, noting in con- currence that the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment. . . . It suffices to prove… - explaining in the context of a Title VII claim that “whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be de- termined only by looking at all the circumstances,” such as “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humi… - finding that 11 whether an environment was hostile or abusive is determined by looking at the totality of the 12 circumstances; “[t]hese may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 13 whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere off… ## Opinion text Justice Ginsburg, concurring. Today the Court reaffirms the holding of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 66 (1986): “[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.” The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. See 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(l) (declaring that it is unlawful to discriminate with respect to, inter alia, “terms” or “conditions” of employment). As the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission emphasized, see Brief for United States and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae 9-14, the adjudicator’s inquiry should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance. To show such interference, “the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment.” Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F. 2d 345, 349 (CA6 1988). It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions as to “ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job.” See ibid. Davis concerned race-based discrimination, but that differ *26 ence does not alter the analysis; except in the rare case in which a bona fide occupational qualification is shown, see Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U. S. 187, 200-207 (1991) (construing 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(e)(l)), Title VII declares discriminatory practices based on race, gender, religion, or national origin equally unlawful. * The Court’s opinion, which I join, seems to me in harmony with the view expressed in this concurring statement. Indeed, even under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, which requires “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for a gender-based classification, Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 461 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted), it remains an open question whether “classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect.” See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 , and n. 9 (1982). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432904. Public record. Not legal advice.