# Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 26, 1992 · 505 U.S. 763

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432672

## Case

- **Full name:** Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 26, 1992
- **Citations:** 505 U.S. 763; 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 643; 92 Daily Journal DAR 8910; 60 U.S.L.W. 4762; 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1081; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5571; 112 S. Ct. 2753; 120 L. Ed. 2d 615; 1992 U.S. LEXIS 4533
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Scalia
- **Judges:** Blackmun, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Stevens, Thomas, White
- **Cited by:** 1,547 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432672

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that, although § 43(a) was intended originally to cover only very specific and narrow types of claims, courts have "expanded the categories of ‘false designation of origin’ and ‘false description or representation'" to create "a federal law of unfair competition” wh…
- holding, in the context of alleged infringement of a restaurant’s Mexican trade dress including layout, color scheme, and decorations, that “proof of secondary meaning is not required to prevail on a claim . . . where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive”
- stating that " § 43(a) [of the Lanham Act, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125,] provides no basis for distinguishing between trademark and trade dress.... There is no persuasive reason to apply different analysis to the two...” (internal citations omitted)
- stating in dicta that “[the lower court] was. quite right ... to follow the Abercrombie classifications consistently and to inquire whether trade dress for which protection is claimed under § 43(a) [of the Lanham Act] is inherently distinctive.”
- stating that “the protection of trademarks and trade dress under § 43(a) serves the same statutory purpose of preventing deception and unfair competition” and that “[tjhere is no persuasive reason to apply different analysis to the two”

## Opinion text

Justice Scalia,
concurring.
I write separately to note my complete agreement with Justice Thomas's explanation as to how the language of § 43(a) and its common-law derivation are broad enough to embrace inherently distinctive trade dress. Nevertheless, because I find that analysis to be complementary to (and not inconsistent with) the Court’s opinion, I concur in the latter.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432672. Public record. Not legal advice.