# R. A. v. v. City of St. Paul > Supreme Court of the United States · June 22, 1992 · 505 U.S. 377 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432643 ## Case - **Full name:** R. A. v. v. CITY OF ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 22, 1992 - **Citations:** 505 U.S. 377; 112 S. Ct. 2538; 120 L. Ed. 2d 305; 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3863 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Blackmun - **Judges:** Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, Soutee, Thomas, White, Blackmun, O'Con-Noe, Stevens, I-A, O'Connor - **Cited by:** 1,761 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432643 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding unconsti- tutional ordinance that prohibited symbols or displays that insult or might provoke violence “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender;” because the ordinance proscribed “messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance,” but not other mess… - holding unconstitutional ordinance that prohibited symbols or displays that insult or might provoke violence “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender;” because the ordinance proscribed “messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance,” but not other messag… - concluding that ordinance making it disorderly conduct for a person to place a symbol, object, or graffiti on property, having reasonable grounds to know it will arouse anger, alarm, or resentment in others based on race, creed, religion, or gender, was impermissible viewpoint… - holding that a bias-motivated disorderly conduct ordinance's viewpoint discrimination was not justified on the ground that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interest in ensuring basic human rights of groups historically discriminated against because… - stating that "[f]rom 1791 to present . . . our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are of such slight value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is cl… ## Opinion text Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment. I regret what the Court has done in this case. The majority opinion signals one of two possibilities: It will serve as precedent for future cases, or it will not. Either result is disheartening. In the first instance, by deciding that a State cannot regulate speech that causes great harm unless it also regulates speech that does not (setting law and logic on their heads), the Court seems to abandon the categorical approach, and inevitably to relax the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based laws. As Justice White points out, this weakens the traditional protections of speech. If all expressive activity must be accorded the same protection, that protection will be scant. The simple reality is that the Court will never provide child pornography or cigarette advertising the level of protection customarily granted political speech. If we are forbidden to categorize, as the Court has done here, we shall reduce protection across the board. It is sad that in its effort to reach a satisfying result in this case, the Court is willing to weaken First Amendment protections. In the second instance is the possibility that this case will not significantly alter First Amendment jurisprudence but, instead, will be regarded as an aberration — a case where the Court manipulated doctrine to strike down an ordinance whose premise it opposed, namely, that racial threats and verbal assaults are of greater harm than other fighting words. I fear that the Court has been distracted from its *416 proper mission by the temptation to decide the issue over “politically correct speech” and “cultural diversity,” neither of which is presented here. If this is the meaning of today’s opinion, it is perhaps even more regrettable. I see no First Amendment values that are compromised by a law that prohibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by burning crosses on their lawns, but I see great harm in preventing the people of Saint Paul from specifically punishing the race-based fighting words that so prejudice their community. I coneur in the judgment, however, because I agree with Justice White that this particular ordinance reaches beyond fighting words to speech protected by the First Amendment. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432643. Public record. Not legal advice.