# Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes > Supreme Court of the United States · May 4, 1992 · 504 U.S. 1 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432526 ## Case - **Full name:** Keeney, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary v. Tamayo-Reyes - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 4, 1992 - **Citations:** 504 U.S. 1; 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 199; 92 Daily Journal DAR 5862; 60 U.S.L.W. 4339; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3785; 112 S. Ct. 1715; 118 L. Ed. 2d 318; 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2690 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Kennedy - **Judges:** White, Rehnquist, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, O'Connor, Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy - **Cited by:** 1,000 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Williams v. Taylor — not on the Supreme Court's list. - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 2 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432526 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that when a state has given a petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to sup- port it, he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evi- dentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the fa… - holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it, he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure … - stating with regard to exhaustion of state administrative remedies that “encouraging the full factual development in state court of a claim that state courts committed constitutional error advances comity by allowing a coordinate jurisdiction to correct its own errors in the f… - holding that AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement requires more than notice, more than petitioner simply stating a federal claim in state court; it requires that the petitioner afford the state court a full and fair opportunity to address his claim - holding that in such circumstances petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless “he can show cause for his *611 failure to develop the facts in the state-court proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure” ## Opinion text *24 Justice Kennedy, dissenting. By definition, the cases within the ambit of the Court’s holding are confined to those in which the factual record developed in the state-court proceedings is inadequate to resolve the legal question. I should think those cases will be few in number. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 318 (1963), has been the law for almost 30 years and there is no clear evidence that this particular classification of habeas proceedings has burdened the dockets of the federal courts. And in my view, the concept of factual inadequacy comprehends only those petitions with respect to which there is a realistic possibility that an evidentiary hearing will make a difference in the outcome. This serves to narrow the number of cases in a further respect and to ensure that they are the ones, as Justice O’Connor points out, in which we have valid concerns with constitutional error. Our recent decisions in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722 (1991), McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467 (1991), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), serve to protect the integrity of the writ, curbing its abuse and ensuring that the legal questions presented are ones which, if resolved against the State, can invalidate a final judgment. So we consider today only those habeas actions which present questions federal courts are bound to decide in order to protect constitutional rights. We ought not to take steps which diminish the likelihood that those courts will base their legal decision on an accurate assessment of the facts. For these reasons and all those set forth by Justice O’Connor, I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432526. Public record. Not legal advice.