# Connecticut National Bank v. Germain

> Supreme Court of the United States · March 9, 1992 · 503 U.S. 249

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432493

## Case

- **Full name:** CONNECTICUT NATIONAL BANK v. GERMAIN, Trustee for the ESTATE OF O’SULLIVAN’S FUEL OIL CO., INC.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** March 9, 1992
- **Citations:** 503 U.S. 249; 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 57; 92 Daily Journal DAR 3080; 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 175; 60 U.S.L.W. 4222; 22 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1130; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1971; 112 S. Ct. 1146; 117 L. Ed. 2d 391; 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1531
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by O'Connor
- **Judges:** Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Stevens, O'Connor, White, Blackmun
- **Cited by:** 2,884 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Stanley v. Crossland (In re Lakeshore Village Resort, Ltd.), 81 F.3d 103 (1996).
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432493

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating in relation to the surplusage canon that "canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stat…
- explaining that canons of construction, like the canon against surplusage, "are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others," the cano…
- Stating that the “cardinal canon” of statutory interpretation is that courts “must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there... .When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘ju…
- finding that the statute governing appellate jurisdiction for bankruptcy cases does not preclude interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. section 1292, because “so long as there is no ‘positive repugnancy’ between two laws, ... a court must give effect to both.”
- stating that “[cjourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete’ ”

## Opinion text

Justice O’Connor,
with whom Justice White and Justice Blackmun join, concurring in the judgment.
I agree that when Congress enacted 28 U. S. C. § 158 (d) as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Congress probably did not intend to deprive the courts of appeals of their longstanding jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in bankruptcy cases. But I think we should admit that this construction of the statutes does render § 158(d) largely superfluous, and that we do strive to interpret statutes so as to avoid redundancy. Cf. ante, at 253-254. In this case, I think it far more likely that Congress inadvertently created a redundancy than that Congress intended to withdraw appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory bankruptcy appeals by the roundabout method of reconfer-ring jurisdiction over appeals from final bankruptcy orders. I would reverse the judgment below only for this reason.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432493. Public record. Not legal advice.