# Mireles v. Waco

> Supreme Court of the United States · October 21, 1991 · 502 U.S. 9

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432416

## Case

- **Full name:** Mireles v. Waco
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** October 21, 1991
- **Citations:** 502 U.S. 9; 112 S. Ct. 286; 116 L. Ed. 2d 9; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 6225
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens
- **Judges:** Scalia, Stevens, Kennedy
- **Cited by:** 4,699 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Peters v. Noonan — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432416

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a judge’s immunity from § 1983 liability “is overcome in only two sets of circumstances”: (i) “a judge- is not immune from liability for nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity,” and (ii) “a judge is not immune for actions, th…
- holding that judge’s actions in directing police officers to bring before judge an attorney who was in courthouse were not taken in complete “absence of all jurisdiction,” so as to deprive judge of judicial immunity from § 1983 suit, even though judge allegedly directed office…
- finding that the state court judge’s order to police officers to bring the plaintiff into the courtroom using excessive force would exceed his authority, but was still protected by judicial immunity because ordering the court officer to bring the plaintiff to court “is a funct…
- holding that judge’s alleged action in directing officers to bring before the court an attorney who was in the courthouse was taken in judge's judicial capacity and, therefore, judge was entitled to absolute immunity even though he allegedly directed officers to carry out the …
- explaining that whether a judge’s act is a judicial one relates to the nature of the act, ie., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge; adding that “we look to the particular act’s relation to a general function normally performed by a judge” and not the particu…

## Opinion text

*14 Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
Judicial immunity attaches only to actions undertaken in a judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 227-229 (1988). In determining whether an action is “judicial,” we consider the nature of the act and whether it is a “function normally performed by a judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349, 362 (1978). *
Respondent Howard Waco alleges that petitioner Judge Raymond Míreles ordered police officers “to forcibly and with excessive force seize and bring” respondent into petitioner’s courtroom. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3, ¶ 7(a). As the Court acknowledges, ordering police officers to use excessive force is “not a ‘function normally performed by a judge.’” Ante, at 12 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 362 ). The Court nevertheless finds that judicial immunity is applicable because of the action’s “relation to a general function normally performed by a judge.” Ante, at 13.
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, as we must in reviewing a motion to dismiss, petitioner issued two commands to the police officers. He ordered them to bring respondent into his courtroom, and he ordered them to commit a battery. The first order was an action taken in a judicial capacity; the second clearly was not. Ordering a battery has no relation to a function normally performed by a judge. If an interval of a minute or two had separated the two orders, it would be undeniable that no immunity would attach to the latter order. The fact that both are alleged to *15 have occurred as part of the same communication does not enlarge the judge’s immunity.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
See also Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 736-737 (1980) (judge not entitled to judicial immunity when acting in enforcement capacity); cf. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520-524 (1985) (Attorney General not absolutely immune when performing “national security,” rather than prosecutorial, function). Moreover, even if the act is “judicial,” judicial immunity does not attach if the judge is acting in the ‘“clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 357 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 (1872)).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432416. Public record. Not legal advice.