# Harmelin v. Michigan > Supreme Court of the United States · June 27, 1991 · 501 U.S. 957 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432404 ## Case - **Full name:** Harmelin v. Michigan - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 27, 1991 - **Citations:** 501 U.S. 957; 111 S. Ct. 2680; 115 L. Ed. 2d 836; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3816 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens - **Judges:** Scalia Announced the Judgment of the Court And - **Cited by:** 3,544 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned by State v. Lindsey, 203 Wis. 2d 423 (1996). - Negative treatments: 8 - Distinguished by: 1 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432404 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating, “[w]hile there are relatively clear historical guidelines and accepted practices that enable judges to determine which modes of punishment are ‘cruel and unusual,’ proportionality does not lend itself to such analysis” and holding a life sentence for a first-time felo… - stating that “[a] better reading of our cases leads to the conclusion that intrajurisdictional and interjurisdic-tional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross… - stating that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments “Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or ‘modes’ of punishment—specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed” and does not contain a “proportionality guarantee” - holding that intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare cases in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality - recognizing the Court’s repeated holding that there is no requirement comparable to the “individualized capital sentencing doctrine” outside the capital context due to “the qualitative difference between death and all other penalties” ## Opinion text Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins, dissenting. While I agree wholeheartedly with Justice White’s dissenting opinion, I believe an additional comment is appropriate. The severity of the sentence that Michigan has mandated for the crime of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine, whether diluted or undiluted, does not place the sentence in the same category as capital punishment. I remain convinced that Justice Stewart correctly characterized the penalty of death as “unique” because of “its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity. ” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). Nevertheless, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole does share one important characteristic of a death sentence: The offender will never regain his freedom. Because such a sentence does not even purport to serve a rehabilitative function, the sentence must rest on a rational determination that the punished “criminal conduct is so atrocious that society’s interest in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of reform or rehabilitation of the perpetrator.” Id., at 307 . Serious as this defendant’s crime was, I believe it is irrational to conclude that every similar offender is wholly incorrigible. The death sentences that were at issue and invalidated in Furman were “cruel and unusual in the same way that being *1029 struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.” Id., at 309 . In my opinion the imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole on this petitioner is equally capricious. As Justice White has pointed out, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, with all relevant enhancements, petitioner’s sentence would barely exceed 10 years. Ante, at 1026-1027. In most States, the period of incarceration for a first offender like petitioner would be substantially shorter. No jurisdiction except Michigan has concluded that the offense belongs in a category where reform and rehabilitation are considered totally unattainable. Accordingly, the notion that this sentence satisfies any meaningful requirement of proportionality is itself both cruel and unusual. I respectfully dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432404. Public record. Not legal advice.