# Arizona v. Fulminante > Supreme Court of the United States · May 20, 1991 · 499 U.S. 279 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432242 ## Case - **Full name:** Arizona v. Fulminante - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 20, 1991 - **Citations:** 499 U.S. 279; 111 S. Ct. 1246; 113 L. Ed. 2d 302; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 1854 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kennedy - **Judges:** White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Souter - **Cited by:** 5,026 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432242 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that harmless error analysis applies to the wrongful admission at trial of coerced confessions; explaining that the essential feature of "trial errors” is that they occur during the presentation of the case to the jury, "and may therefore be quantitatively assessed in … - explaining that by classifying most constitutional errors — including coerced confessions — as "trial errors,” the Court remains faithful to the view that harmless error is necessary to preserve the " '[p]rinciple that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the f… - stating that while some types of trial errors are susceptible to “quantitative [ ] assessment] in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether ... [the errors were] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” other kinds of errors are not subject to harmless-… - explaining that structural errors are “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards,” in contrast to “trial errors,” which are errors that occur during the presentation of the case to the factfinder and which … - holding that the use of coerced confession at trial was a structural error; recognizing deprivation of the right to an impartial judge as a structural error and explaining that “[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is so obviously affected . . . by the prese… ## Opinion text *313 Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment. For the reasons stated by The Chief Justice, I agree that Fulminante’s confession to Anthony Sarivola was not coerced. In my view, the trial court did not err in admitting this testimony. A majority of the Court, however, finds the confession coerced and proceeds to consider whether harmless-error analysis may be used when a coerced confession has been admitted at trial. With the case in this posture, it is appropriate for me to address the harmless-error issue. Again for the reasons stated by The Chief Justice, I agree that harmless-error analysis should apply in the case of a coerced confession. That said, the court conducting a harmless-error inquiry must appreciate the indelible impact a full confession may have on the trier of fact, as distinguished, for instance, from the impact of an isolated statement that incriminates the defendant only when connected with other evidence. If the jury believes that a defendant has admitted the crime, it doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on that evidence alone, without careful consideration of the other evidence in the case. Apart, perhaps, from a videotape of the crime, one would have difficulty finding evidence more damaging to a criminal defendant’s plea of innocence. For the reasons given by Justice White in Part IV of his opinion, I cannot with confidence find admission of Fulmi-nante’s confession to Anthony Sarivola to be harmless error. The same majority of the Court does not agree on the three issues presented by the trial court’s determination to admit Fulminante’s first confession: whether the confession was inadmissible because coerced; whether harmless-error analysis is appropriate; and if so whether any error was harmless here. My own view that the confession was not coerced does not command a majority. In the interests of providing a clear mandate to the Arizona Supreme Court in this capital case, I deem it proper to accept in the case now before us the holding of five Justices that the *314 confession was coerced and inadmissible. I agree with a majority of the Court that admission of the confession could not be harmless error when viewed in light of all the other evidence; and so I concur in the judgment to affirm the ruling of the Arizona Supreme Court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432242. Public record. Not legal advice.