# Sullivan v. Finkelstein

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 18, 1990 · 496 U.S. 617

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432080

## Case

- **Full name:** Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Finkelstein
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 18, 1990
- **Citations:** 496 U.S. 617; 110 S. Ct. 2658; 110 L. Ed. 2d 563; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 3187
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Blackmun
- **Judges:** White, Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Blackmun
- **Cited by:** 681 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Kowalick v. Sullivan, 812 F. Supp. 534 (1993).
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 2
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432080

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that a remand under “[t]he sixth sentence of § 405(g) . . . [is] appropriate when the district court learns of evidence not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding that might have changed the outcome of that proceeding” (e…
- stating that “post-enactment legislative history” is an oxymo *919 ron and should not be considered in interpreting statutes and that even the proponents of its use limit it to statements from members of the legislative body that enacted the statute
- stating that “post-enactment legislative history” is an oxymoron and should not be considered in interpreting statutes and that even the proponents of its use limit it to statements from members of the same legislative body that enacted the statute
- stating that Apost-enactment legislative history@ is an oxymoron and should not be considered in interpreting statutes and that even the proponents of its use limit it to statements from members of the same legislative body that enacted the statute
- explaining that a sentence four remand can be ordered for various reasons, including to expand on an insufficient administrative record, while a remand pursuant to sentence six is appropriate where “‘the district court learns of [new] evidence’

## Opinion text

Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
I am not convinced, as the other Members of the Court appear to be, that the order with which we are concerned is a final decision. It seems to me that the Court in its opinion expends its energy fending off respondent’s arguments as to nonappealability, without itself demonstrating finality in a positive way.
I concur in the judgment, however. Although I think the order is not a final decision under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 , it is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine enunciated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). This is the view adopted by the great majority of the Courts of Appeals, and I am in agreement with their conclusions. See, e. g., Colon v. Secretary of HHS, 877 F. 2d 148, 151-152 (CA1 1989); Doughty v. Bowen, 839 F. 2d 644, 645-646 (CA10 1988); Huie v. Bowen, 788 F. 2d 698, 701-703 (CA11 1986).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9432080. Public record. Not legal advice.