# New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans > Supreme Court of the United States · June 19, 1989 · 491 U.S. 350 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431763 ## Case - **Full name:** NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC. v. COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 19, 1989 - **Citations:** 491 U.S. 350; 103 P.U.R.4th 49; 57 U.S.L.W. 4755; 109 S. Ct. 2506; 105 L. Ed. 2d 298; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3043 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Rehnquist - **Judges:** Scalia, Brennan, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Marshall - **Cited by:** 1,668 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Reported abrogated in part, on other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance, 517 U.S. 706 (1996) — not on the Supreme Court's list. - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 2 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431763 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding Burford abstention inappropriate because the plaintiffs’ case did not “involve a The counter-argument is, of course, that even if the tariffing state-law claim, nor even an assertion that the federal claims requirement established in the February 25 order were struck d… - explaining that the "proper characterization” of a proceeding "depends not upon the character of the body but upon the character of the proceedings,” and holding that "a judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and… - explaining that "[w]hile Burford is concerned with protecting complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference, it does not require abstention whenever there exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a 'potential for conflict' with state … - explaining “concern for comity and federalism has led us to expand the protection of Younger beyond state criminal prosecutions to civil enforcement proceedings, and even to civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ abilit… ## Opinion text Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in Parts I and II-B and concurring in the judgment. I agree with the Court that our prior cases extending Younger beyond criminal prosecutions to civil proceedings have limited its application to proceedings which are “judicial in nature,” and that, under our longstanding characterization of the distinction between “judicial” and “legislative” proceedings, see Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226 (1908), the Council’s ratemaking proceedings at issue here were not judicial in nature. Under these circum *374 stances, I agree that Younger abstention is inappropriate, despite the pendency of state-court review of the Council’s ratemaking order. Nothing in the Court’s opinion curtails our prior application of Younger to certain administrative proceedings which are “judicial in nature,” see Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U. S. 619 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U. S. 423 (1982); nor does it alter our prior case law indicating that such proceedings should be regarded as “ongoing” for the purposes of Younger abstention until state appellate review is completed, see Dayton Christian Schools, supra, at 629. With this understanding, I join the portion of the Court’s opinion holding that Younger abstention is inappropriate here. I agree with the Court’s conclusion that Burford abstention is inappropriate on the facts of this case. But I would not foreclose the possibility of Burford abstention in a case like this had the State consolidated review of the orders of local ratemaking bodies in a specialized state court with power to hear a federal pre-emption claim. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment as to Burford abstention. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431763. Public record. Not legal advice.