# Alabama v. Smith

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 12, 1989 · 490 U.S. 794

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431698

## Case

- **Full name:** Alabama v. Smith
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 12, 1989
- **Citations:** 490 U.S. 794; 57 U.S.L.W. 4626; 109 S. Ct. 2201; 104 L. Ed. 2d 865; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2839
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Marshall
- **Judges:** Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Marshall
- **Cited by:** 1,440 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431698

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that when a defendant is resentenced and receives a greater sentence than that which was originally ordered, the possibility that judicial vindictiveness motivated the increased sentence may implicate the due process concern that defendants will be chilled from exercis…
- explaining “whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for him doing so must affirmatively appear. . . . Otherwise, a presumption arises that . . . must be rebutted by objective information . . . justifying the increased sen…
- holding that a presumption of vindictiveness following imposition of a more severe sentence applies only where "there is a reasonable likelihood that the al-crease in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority”
- holding that “no presumption of vindictiveness arises when the first sentence was based upon a guilty plea, and the second [increased] sentence follows a trial” after the defendant succeeds in having his guilty plea vacated
- explaining that the presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when a defendant is originally sentenced after pleading guilty and then resentenced after a subsequent trial, even when the same judge imposes both sentences

## Opinion text

Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
After successfully challenging the validity of his plea bargain on the ground that the trial judge had misinformed him about the penalties he could face, respondent Smith went to trial. He was convicted and resentenced to a drastically longer sentence than the one he had initially received as a result of his plea bargain. The majority today finds no infirmity in this result. I, however, continue to believe that, “if for any reason a new trial is granted and there is a conviction a second time, the second penalty imposed cannot exceed the first penalty, if respect is had for the guarantee against *804 double jeopardy.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 726-727 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.) (emphasis added). I therefore dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431698. Public record. Not legal advice.