# Graham v. Connor > Supreme Court of the United States · May 15, 1989 · 490 U.S. 386 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431667 ## Case - **Full name:** GRAHAM v. CONNOR Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 15, 1989 - **Citations:** 490 U.S. 386; 57 U.S.L.W. 4513; 109 S. Ct. 1865; 104 L. Ed. 2d 443; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2467 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Blackmun - **Judges:** Rehnquist, White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall - **Cited by:** 16,199 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Jackson v. Johnson, 118 F. Supp. 2d 278 (2000). - Negative treatments: 3 - Distinguished by: 4 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431667 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that to determining whether force used was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. . . . [T… - stating that “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivati… - finding that, although the Eighth Circuit had not yet determined whether an officer’s use of a taser on a nonviolent, nonfleeing misde-meanant was an excessive use of force, “the general constitutional principles against excessive use of force that were clearly established at … - stating that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends on, among other things, “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to… - holding that “the question [in an excessive-force claim] is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation,” such that “[a]n officer’s evil intentions … ## Opinion text Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join the Court’s opinion insofar as it rules that the Fourth Amendment is the primary tool for analyzing claims of excessive force in the prearrest context, and I concur in the judgment remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of the evidence under a reasonableness standard. In light of respondents’ concession, however, that the pleadings in this case properly may be construed as raising a Fourth Amendment claim, see Brief for Respondents 3,1 see no reason for the Court to find it necessary further to reach out to decide that prearrest excessive force claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than under a *400 substantive due process standard. I also see no basis for the Court’s suggestion, ante, at 395, that our decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), implicitly so held. Nowhere in Garner is a substantive due process standard for evaluating the use of excessive force in a particular case discussed; there is no suggestion that such a standard was offered as an alternative and rejected. In this case, petitioner apparently decided that it was in his best interest to disavow the continued applicability of substantive due process analysis as an alternative basis for recovery in prearrest excessive force cases. See Brief for Petitioner 20. His choice was certainly wise as a matter of litigation strategy in his own case, but does not (indeed, cannot be expected to) serve other potential plaintiffs equally well. It is for that reason that the Court would have done better to leave that question for another day. I expect that the use of force that is not demonstrably unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment only rarely will raise substantive due process concerns. But until I am faced with a case in which that question is squarely raised, and its merits are subjected to adversary presentation, I do not join in foreclosing the use of substantive due process analysis in prearrest cases. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431667. Public record. Not legal advice.