# Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa

> Supreme Court of the United States · May 1, 1989 · 490 U.S. 296

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431662

## Case

- **Full name:** MALLARD v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** May 1, 1989
- **Citations:** 490 U.S. 296; 57 U.S.L.W. 4487; 109 S. Ct. 1814; 104 L. Ed. 2d 318; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2232
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kennedy
- **Judges:** Brennan, Rehnquist, White, Scalia, Kennedy, Stevens, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor
- **Cited by:** 5,044 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431662

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[s]tatutory provisions may simply codify existing rights or powers,” and that “[s]ection 1915(d) [of Title 28 of the United States Code], for example, authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is little doubt they would have power …
- holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize federal court to require unwilling lawyer to represent indigent litigant in civil case and explaining elaborate plan that Iowa district courts had developed with assistance of state bar and Legal Services Corporation to recruit …
- holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize compulsory appointment of 1 Bailey’s Tramadol prescription expired in November 2017. Because Tramadol is a habit-forming synthetic opioid, the prescription was not renewed. ECF No. 16-5 at 3-4. counsel
- concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c
- recognizing that “district courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee”

## Opinion text

Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
Our decision today speaks to the interpretation of a statute, to the requirements of the law, and not to the professional responsibility of the lawyer. Lawyers, like all those who practice a profession, have obligations to their calling which exceed their obligations to the State. Lawyers also have obligations by virtue of their special status as officers of *311 the court. Accepting a court’s request to represent the indigent is one of those traditional obligations. Our judgment here does not suggest otherwise. To the contrary, it is precisely because our duties go beyond what the law demands that ours remains a noble profession.
I join in full the opinion of the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431662. Public record. Not legal advice.