# DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services

> Supreme Court of the United States · February 22, 1989 · 489 U.S. 189

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431572

## Case

- **Full name:** DeSHANEY, a Minor, by His Guardian Ad Litem, Et Al. v. WINNEBAGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** February 22, 1989
- **Citations:** 489 U.S. 189; 57 U.S.L.W. 4218; 109 S. Ct. 998; 103 L. Ed. 2d 249; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 1039
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Blackmun
- **Judges:** Rehnquist, White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
- **Cited by:** 4,353 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633 (1996).
- Negative treatments: 5
- Distinguished by: 9
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431572

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that the Due Process Clause is "phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security" and thus concluding that "our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmativ…
- explaining “the State does not become the permanent guarantor of an individual’s safety by having once offered him shelter,” and reasoning that simply because “the State once took temporary custody of [of a minor child pending investigation of suspected child abuse] does not a…
- explaining that the Due Process Clause "forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not…
- holding that “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf — through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty — which is the ‘deprivation…
- stating “when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable saf…

## Opinion text

Justice Blackmun,
dissenting.
Today, the Court purports to be the dispassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by "natural sympathy.” Ante, at 202. But, in this pretense, the Court itself retreats into a sterile formalism which prevents it from recognizing either the facts of the case before it or the legal norms that should apply to those facts. As Justice Brennan demonstrates, the facts here involve not mere passivity, but active state intervention in the life of Joshua DeShaney — intervention that triggered a fundamental duty to aid the boy once the State learned of the severe danger to which he was exposed.
The Court fails to recognize this duty because it attempts to draw a sharp and rigid line between action and inaction. But such formalistic reasoning has no place in the interpretation of the broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, I submit that these Clauses were designed, at least in part, to undo the formalistic legal reasoning that infected antebellum jurisprudence, which the late Professor Robert Cover analyzed so effectively in his significant work entitled Justice Accused (1975).
Like the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves, see id., at 119-121, the Court today claims that its decision, however harsh, is compelled by existing legal doctrine. On the contrary, the question presented by this case *213 is an open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a “sympathetic” reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging. Cf. A. Stone, Law, Psychiatry, and Morality 262 (1984) (“We will make mistakes if we go forward, but doing nothing can be the worst mistake. What is required of us is moral ambition. Until our composite sketch becomes a true portrait of humanity we must live with our uncertainty; we will grope, we will struggle, and our compassion may be our only guide and comfort”).
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, ante, at 193, “dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] files.” It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles — so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about “liberty and justice for all”— that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded. Joshua and his mother, as petitioners here, deserve — but now are denied by this Court — the opportunity to have the facts of their case considered in the light of the constitutional protection that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is meant to provide.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431572. Public record. Not legal advice.
