# Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch > Supreme Court of the United States · February 21, 1989 · 489 U.S. 101 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431567 ## Case - **Full name:** FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. Et Al. v. BRUCH Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** February 21, 1989 - **Citations:** 489 U.S. 101; 57 U.S.L.W. 4194; 10 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1873; 109 S. Ct. 948; 103 L. Ed. 2d 80; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 599 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Scalia - **Judges:** O'Connor, Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy, Scalia - **Cited by:** 6,362 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431567 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that trust principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers. Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to … - stating that imposing arbitrary-and-caprieious standard of review for claims denials would give less protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they had before ERISA was enacted; refusing to apply such standard in all cases, and holding de novo review standard applie… - holding that “a denial of benefits ... must be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan expressly gives the plan administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the plan’s terms, in which case a deferenti… - concluding that "the term 'participant' is naturally read to mean either 'employees in, or reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment, or former employees who have a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment or who have a colorable claim of vest… - concluding that when an administrator entrusted with discretionary authority is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be “weighed as a ‘factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion’ ” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187, cmt. d (… ## Opinion text *119 Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join the judgment of the Court and Parts I and II of its opinion. I agree with its disposition but not all of its reasoning regarding Part III. The Court holds that a person with a colorable claim is one who “ ‘may become eligible’ for benefits” within the meaning of the statutory definition of “participant,” because, it reasons, such a claim raises the possibility that “he or she will prevail in a suit for benefits.” Ante, at 117. The relevant portion of the definition, however, refers to an employee “who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit.” There is an obvious parallelism here: one “may become” eligible by acquiring, in the future, the same characteristic of eligibility that someone who “is” eligible now possesses. And I find it contrary to normal usage to think that the characteristic of “being” eligible consists of “having prevailed in a suit for benefits.” Eligibility exists not merely during the brief period between formal judgment of entitlement and payment of benefits. Rather, one is eligible whether or not he has yet been adjudicated to be — and, similarly, one can become eligible before he is adjudicated to be. It follows that the phrase “may become eligible” has nothing to do with the probabilities of winning a suit. I think that, properly read, the definition of “participant” embraces those whose benefits have vested, and those who (by reason of current or former employment) have some potential to receive the vesting of benefits in the future, but not those who have a good argument that benefits have vested even though they have not. Applying the definition in this fashion would mean, of course, that if the employer guesses right that a person with a colorable claim is in fact not entitled to benefits, he can deny that person the information required to be provided under 29 U. S. C. § 1024 (b)(4) without paying the $100-a-day damages assessable for breach of that obligation, 29 U. S. C. § 1132 (c)(1)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Since, however, no em *120 ployer sensible enough to consult the law would be senseless enough to take that risk, giving the term its defined meaning would produce precisely the same incentive for disclosure as the Court’s opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431567. Public record. Not legal advice.