# Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey > Supreme Court of the United States · December 12, 1988 · 488 U.S. 153 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431492 ## Case - **Full name:** BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION v. RAINEY Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** December 12, 1988 - **Citations:** 488 U.S. 153; 1989 A.M.C. 441; 26 Fed. R. Serv. 257; 57 U.S.L.W. 4043; 109 S. Ct. 439; 102 L. Ed. 2d 445; 1988 U.S. LEXIS 5631 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Rehnquist - **Judges:** Brennan, Rehnquist, O'Con-Nor - **Cited by:** 682 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431492 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that a report was admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) and stating that while the rule “assumes admissibility” once the threshold requirements are satisfied, the “trustworthiness inquiry” is a “provision for escape” and is the “primary safeguard against the admission of unr… - holding that the analogous federal rule of completeness is designed “to secure for the tribunal a complete understanding of the total tenor and effect of the utterance” (quoting 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2113, p. 653 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1978)) - holding that the trial judge erred in excluding an expert’s testimony ″merely because it overlaps with matters within the jury’s experience″ - holding "a trial judge has the discretion, and indeed the obligation, to exclude an entire report, or portions thereof— whether narrow 'factual' statements or broader 'conclusions’ — that she determines to be untrustworthy” - concluding “when a seaman dies from an indivisible injury caused in part by unseaworthiness and inflicted over a period during which the vessel of which he is a member of the crew cruised coastal waters and high seas, the seaman’s survivors may recover damages for loss of soci… ## Opinion text *176 Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice O’Con-nor joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion, but dissent from Part III. I do not believe the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to admit this particular testimony. The Court concedes that “counsel did not explain the evidentiary basis of his argument'as thoroughly as might ideally be desired ...” ante, at 174, but I would go further and say that counsel’s brief presentation to the District Court was ambiguous at best. Rainey’s attorney was faced with an objection to testimony he wished to elicit from his client based on opposing counsel’s perception that it would be nonexpert opinion. 1 He responded by saying “[o]n the basis that this letter constitutes an admission by Commander Rainey, he has been asked to answer every single question [opposing counsel] had respecting — .” App. 77. At that point the court cut in with an explanation of why that answer was insufficient. The judge explained: “I don’t recall going into anything except the matter about the right turn and so forth, and that’s all he went into. He did express that opinion and that came in as an admission against him, I suppose, but that doesn’t mean you can[’t] qualify him for the questions you are now asking. The objection is sustained.” Id., at 78. Rainey’s lawyer seems to have been arguing that, because no one objected to Rainey’s answers to defendant’s questions about the letter as nonexpert opinion, Rainey should be able to answer similar questions put by his own attorney without that objection. The argument looks more like one based on *177 fairness or waiver (often known as “opening the door” 2 ) than one based specifically on completeness. That is how the judge understood it. He explained his ruling sustaining the objection by noting that although the defense questioning had elicited some opinion, it was admissible on other grounds and then suggested that Rainey’s lawyer qualify Rainey as an expert. Here the trial judge ruled on the basis of a reasonable understanding of respondents’ stated reasons for allowing the evidence to be admitted, and the trial judge made this understanding clear to respondents’ counsel. The evidence was not admissible under this view, and counsel made no attempt to clarify his position. Today, the Court offers sound reasons for the admission of the testimony in question, but they are reasons which it has adduced from briefs and careful research, not the reasons expressed by counsel at trial. “If counsel specifies a purpose for which the proposed evidence is inadmissible and the judge excludes, counsel cannot complain of the ruling on appeal though it could have been rightly admitted for another purpose.” E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence §51, p. 125 (3d ed. 1984). Trial judges do not have the luxury of briefs or research when making a typical evidentiary ruling, and for this reason we have traditionally required the proponent of evidence to defend it against objection by showing why it should be admissible. Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2) requires an “offer of proof” in order to preserve for review a perceived error excluding evidence. 3 Most courts and treatises have *178 interpreted the need for an “offer of proof” as requiring a specific and timely defense of the evidence. See 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 103[03], pp. 103-36 to 103-38 (1988); 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure §5040, pp. 209-211 (1977); United States v. Peters, 732 F. 2d 1004 (CA1 1984); United States v. Grapp, 653 F. 2d 189, 194 (CA5 1981); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F. 2d 286 (CA7 1979). The need for a showing of evidence is the same, whether it is an essential part of the “offer of proof,” or, as the Court agrees, required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46. 4 The disagreement in these cases is not about applicable Rules of Evidence, but how a trial judge should fairly have understood an offer of proof under these circumstances. This Court, far removed from the factual context and on the basis of a cold record, is in no position to say that the trial court’s ruling in this situation was an abuse of discretion. Cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 575 (1985). The entire colloquy relevant to the exclusion of Rainey’s testimony about the letter is set out ante, at 173, n. 16. According to 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5039, p. 199 (1977) one doctrine which allows even a valid and timely objection to be defeated is variously known as “waiver,” “estoppel,” “opening the door,” “fighting fire with fire,” and “curative admissibility.” The doctrine’s soundness depends on the specific situation in which it is used and calls for an exercise of judicial discretion. For the full text of the Rule, see ante, at 174, n. 19. Ante, at 174. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431492. Public record. Not legal advice.