# Riley v. National Federation of Blind of North Carolina, Inc. > Supreme Court of the United States · June 29, 1988 · 487 U.S. 781 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431449 ## Case - **Full name:** RILEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE TENTH PROSECUTORIAL DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, Et Al. v. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 29, 1988 - **Citations:** 487 U.S. 781; 56 U.S.L.W. 4869; 108 S. Ct. 2667; 101 L. Ed. 2d 669; 1988 U.S. LEXIS 3031 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Scalia - **Judges:** Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Kennedy, Stevens, Scalia, Rehnqcist, O'Connor - **Cited by:** 786 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431449 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that even assuming, arguendo, that charitable solicitations were “in the abstract ... merely ‘commercial,’ we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with ... fully protected speech” on issues of public import… - holding that a law aimed at preventing fraud by requiring professional fundraisers to disclose the percentage of charitable contributions collected during the previous year that were actually turned over to charity is not narrowly tailored partly because a state “may vigorousl… - holding that regulation requiring professional fund raisers to disclose to its audience that portion of the annual funds actually given to charity was subject to the test for fully protected expression, not the more deferential commercial speech principles, as the commercial p… - holding unconstitutional state requirement that professional fundraisers disclose to prospective donors factual information concerning the percentage of contributions actually passed on to charities notwithstanding the fact that prospective donors might find the *74 truthful i… - holding that a statute regulating charities’ solicitation by professional fund raisers was not narrowly tailored to promoting the state’s interest in protecting the public and charities from fraud, and to ensuring maximum financial support for the charities for their own benefit ## Opinion text Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in judgment. We ftave held the solicitation of money by charities to be fully protected as the dissemination of ideas. See ante, at 787-789; Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 959-961 (1984); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 628-632 (1980). It is axiomatic that, although fraudulent misrepresentation of facts can be regulated, cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), the dissemination of ideas cannot be regulated to .prevent it from being unfair or unreasonable, see, e. g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 51, 54, 57 (1988); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 256-258 (1974); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971); Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of New York, 360 U. S. 684, 688-689 (1959); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 673-674 (1944). Because the opinion of the Court, except for footnote 11, is consistent with this principle, I join all of the opinion with that exception. As to the last two sentences of that footnote, which depart from the case at hand to make a pronouncement upon a situation that is not before us, I do' not see how requiring the professional solicitor to disclose his professional status is narrowly tailored to prevent fraud. Where core First Amendment speech is at issue, the State can assess liability for specific instances of deliberate deception, but it cannot impose' a prophylactic rule requiring disclosure even where misleading statements are not made. Cf. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 843-844 (1978). *804 Since donors are assuredly aware that a portion of their donations may go to solicitation costs and other administrative expenses — whether the solicitor is a professional, an in-house employee, or even a volunteer — it is not misleading in the great mass of cases for a professional solicitor to request donations “for” a specific charity without announcing his professional status. Compensatory employment is, I would judge, the natural order of things, and one would expect volunteer solicitors to announce that status as a selling point. The dictum in footnote 11 represents a departure from our traditional understanding, embodied in the First Amendment, that where the dissemination of ideas is concerned, it is safer to assume that the people are smart enough to get the information they need than to assume that the government is wise or impartial enough to make the judgment for them. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431449. Public record. Not legal advice.