# Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co. > Supreme Court of the United States · June 24, 1988 · 487 U.S. 312 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431408 ## Case - **Full name:** TORRES v. OAKLAND SCAVENGER CO. Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 24, 1988 - **Citations:** 487 U.S. 312; 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 6; 56 U.S.L.W. 4740; 46 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 38,066; 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 116; 108 S. Ct. 2405; 101 L. Ed. 2d 285; 1988 U.S. LEXIS 2879 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Scalia - **Judges:** Marshall, Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Brennan - **Cited by:** 1,145 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Retail Flooring Dealers of America, Inc. v. Beaulieu of America, LLC — not on the Supreme Court's list. - Negative treatments: 2 - Distinguished by: 5 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431408 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over a party not specified in the notice of appeal as required by Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(A); specifically, appellant’s use of "et al.” in the notice of appeal was insufficient to notify defendant or the court that interveno… - stating that if litigant files papers in fashion that is technically at variance with letter of procedural rule, court may nonetheless find that litigant has complied with rule if litigant’s action is functional equivalent of what rule requires, but holding that FRAP Rule 3(c)… - holding that a court “may not waive the jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and 4, even for ‘good cause shown’ under Rule 2, if it finds that they have not been met” and noting that any “harshness” in the application of these Rules “is imposed by the legislature and not by … - stating that F.R.A.P. 3, which is substantially similar to V.R.A.P. 3, requires “some designation that gives fair notice of the specific individual or entity seeking to appeal” and concluding that the use of the phrase “et al.” fails to provide such notice to potential opponen… - concluding that the district court “had the power to consider the petition to modify the agreement to dismiss the suit” because Rule 60(b) “speaks of relief from a final ‘proceeding’” and “[t]he [Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary] dismissal of the suit was . . . a proceeding, and it was… ## Opinion text Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment; I agree with the judgment of the Court, but I db not believe that the principles set forth in its opinion produce it. If it is the fact that the requirements of the rulés of procedure should be “liberally construed,” that “‘mere .technicalities’ should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits,” and that a rule is complied with if “the litigant’s action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires,” ante, at 316, it would seem to me that a caption listing the first party to the case and then adding “et al.” is enough to suggest that all parties are taking the appeal; arid that the later omission of one of the parties in listing the appellants can, “liberally viewed,” be deemed to create no more than an *319 ambiguity which does not destroy the effect of putting the ap-pellee on notice. The principle that “mere technicalities” should not stand in the way of deciding a case on the merits is more a prescription for ignoring the Federal Rules than a useful guide to their construction and application. By definition all rules of procedure are technicalities; sanction for failure to comply with them always prevents the court from deciding where justice lies in the particular case, on the theory that securing a fair and orderly process enables more justice to be done in the totality of cases. It seems to me, moreover, that we should seek to interpret the rules neither liberally nor stingily, but only, as best we can, according to their apparent intent. Where that intent is to provide leeway, a permissive construction is the right one; where it is to be strict, a permissive construction is wrong. Thus, the very first of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe that they are to be “liberally construed,” but rather that they are to be “construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. The Appellate Rule at issue here requires the appellant to “specify the party or parties taking the appeal,” Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(c), which suggests to me more than just a residual “et al.” Moreover, that it was thought necessary to specify that “informality of form or title” would not entail dismissal, ibid., suggests that a strict application was generally contemplated. I concur in today’s judgment, therefore, for essentially the same reasons that I dissented from the judgment in Houston v. Lack, ante, p. 266, which the Court appropriately cites to support its reasoning in the present case, but which in my view stands in stark contrast to its conclusion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431408. Public record. Not legal advice.