# Wheat v. United States

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 30, 1988 · 486 U.S. 153

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431312

## Case

- **Full name:** Wheat v. United States
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 30, 1988
- **Citations:** 486 U.S. 153; 108 S. Ct. 1692; 100 L. Ed. 2d 140; 1988 U.S. LEXIS 2306
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens
- **Judges:** Kennedy, Marshall, O'ConnoR, Rehnquist, Scalia, Stevens, White
- **Cited by:** 1,802 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by United States v. Manuel Ramos, 350 F. Supp. 2d 413 (2004).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431312

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that because “[t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict ... the district court must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be d…
- explaining that "while the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant ... [is…
- holding that federal courts “must recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner’s counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict [of interest] but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict. The evaluation of the f…
- holding that the judge must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing to accept an defendant's waiver of a conflict of interest "not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflic…
- holding that a court may disqualify a lawyer 15 who is willing to accept a client's waiver of a conflict of interest and observing "that the willingness of an attorney to obtain such waivers from his clients may bear an inverse relation to the care with which he conveys all th…

## Opinion text

Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Blackmun joins, dissenting.
This is not the first case in which the Court has demonstrated “its apparent unawareness of the function of the independent lawyer as a guardian of our freedom.” Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 371 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). But even under the Court’s paternalistic view of the citizen’s right to select his or her own lawyer, its analysis of this case is seriously flawed. As Justice Marshall demonstrates, the Court exaggerates the significance of the potential conflict. See ante, at 168-172. Of greater importance, the Court gives inadequate weight to the informed and voluntary character of the clients’ waiver of their right to conflict-free representation. Particularly, the Court virtually ignores the fact that additional counsel representing petitioner had provided him with sound advice concerning the wisdom of a waiver and would have remained available during the trial to assist in the defense. Thus, this is not a case in which the District Judge faced the question whether one counsel should be substituted for another; rather the question before him *173 was whether petitioner should be permitted to have additional counsel of his choice. I agree with Justice Marshall that the answer to that question is perfectly clear.
Accordingly, although I agree with the Court’s premise that district judges must be afforded wide latitude in passing on motions of this kind, * in this case it is abundantly clear to me that the District Judge abused his discretion and deprived this petitioner of a constitutional right of such fundamental character that reversal is required.
In my view, deference to the trial judge is appropriate in light of his or her greater familiarity with such factors as the ability of the defendant knowingly and voluntarily to waive a potential conflict (including the possibility that a codefendant may be exerting undue influence over the defendant), the character of the lawyers, the particular facts of the case, and the availability of alternative counsel of a like caliber.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431312. Public record. Not legal advice.
