# Taylor v. Illinois

> Supreme Court of the United States · March 28, 1988 · 484 U.S. 400

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431170

## Case

- **Full name:** Taylor v. Illinois
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** March 28, 1988
- **Citations:** 484 U.S. 400; 108 S. Ct. 646; 98 L. Ed. 2d 798; 1988 U.S. LEXIS 573
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Blackmun
- **Judges:** Stevens, Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
- **Cited by:** 1,702 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431170

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that if the failure to disclose a defense witness was "willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, it would be entirely consistent with the purp…
- holding that the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment permits exclusion of testimony of a defense witness as a sanction for violating a discovery rule because it was “reasonable to presume that there is something suspect about a defense witness who is not identifie…
- finding that exclusion of evidence proper where counsel’s explanation for intentionally failing to disclose evidence was “motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage” that would “minimize the effectiveness” of the other party’s examination and their ability to adduce …
- explaining that the Court implicitly concluded that the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim was “sufficiently well presented to the state courts to support our jurisdiction . . . because the analysis in this case would essentially be the same under the Due Process Clause.”
- stating that submitted. Baze has not asserted that the relevant rules are “[t]he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary unconstitutional in light of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 system is both fundamental and comprehensive”

## Opinion text

Justice Blackmun,
dissenting.
I join Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion on the understanding — at least on my part — that it is confined in its reach to general reciprocal-discovery rules. I do not wish to have the opinion express for me any position as to permissible sanctions for noncompliance with rules designed for specific kinds of evidence as, for example, a notice-of-alibi rule. In a case such as that, the State’s legitimate interests might well occasion a result different from what should obtain in the factual context of the present case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431170. Public record. Not legal advice.