# Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 19, 1987 · 482 U.S. 656

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431049

## Case

- **Full name:** GOODMAN Et Al. v. LUKENS STEEL CO. Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 19, 1987
- **Citations:** 482 U.S. 656; 55 U.S.L.W. 4881; 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1; 43 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,099; 107 S. Ct. 2617; 96 L. Ed. 2d 572; 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2730
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by O'Connor
- **Judges:** White, Rehnquist, Stevens, Powell, Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, Black-Mun, Blackmun, O'Connor
- **Cited by:** 742 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 1
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431049

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “union which intentionally avoids asserting discrimination claims, either so as not to antagonize the employer and thus improve its chances of success on other issues, or in deference to the perceived desires of its white membership, is liable under * * * § 1981”
- holding that a union “discriminates” within the meaning of Title VII when it “pursue[s] a policy of rejecting disparate-treatment grievances presented by blacks solely because the claims assert racial bias and would be very troublesome to process”
- holding that liability for intentional discrimination under § 1981 requires only that decisions be premised on race, not that they be motivated by racial hostility or animus
- holding that the Glus exception did not apply, and that complainant was required to name the union even though a contractual relationship existed between an employer and union via a collective bargaining agreement
- finding that “[t]he Court of Appeals was correct in selecting the Pennsylvania 2-year limitations period governing personal injury actions” as the applicable limitations period for claims brought under § 1981

## Opinion text

Justice O’Connor,
concurring in the judgment in No. 85-1626 and dissenting in No. 85-2010.'
In light of the Court’s decision to apply a uniform characterization for limitations purposes to actions arising under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 , I agree that the most appropriate choice is each State’s limitations period for personal injury suits. But see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 280-287 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Although I doubt whether the Court’s decision should be given general retroactive effect, I agree that the Court should adhere to its policy of applying the rule *690 it announces to the parties before the Court. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 301 (1967). I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court in No. 85-1626. I join Parts I through IV of Justice Powell’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, as to No. 85-2010.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431049. Public record. Not legal advice.