# Bowen v. Yuckert

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 8, 1987 · 482 U.S. 137

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431011

## Case

- **Full name:** Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Yuckert
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 8, 1987
- **Citations:** 482 U.S. 137; 55 U.S.L.W. 4735; 107 S. Ct. 2287; 96 L. Ed. 2d 119; 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2477
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Blackmun
- **Judges:** Powell, Rehnquist, White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, O'Con-Nor, Blackmun, Beennan, Marshall
- **Cited by:** 9,681 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431011

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that "[t]he severity regulation increases the efficiency and reliability of the evaluation process by identifying at an early stage those claimants whose medical impairments are so slight that it is unlikely that they would be found disabled even if the age, education …
- explaining that by 1987 federal courts had "either enjoined the Secretary's use of the [significant impairment] regulation or imposed a narrowing construction upon it" based on statistical evidence that too many claimants were being denied disability based on their inability t…
- explaining that step three “streamlines the decision process by identifying those claimants whose medical impairments are so severe that it is likely they would be found disabled regardless of their vocational background.”
- finding that it is immaterial which impairments or how many impairments an ALJ designates as severe because the standard used at step two is merely a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims
- recognizing that the severity determination is meant “to screen out de minimis claims”

## Opinion text

Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
The definition of “disability” for purposes of the disability-insurance benefits program is set forth in § 223(d) of the Social Security Act, codified, as amended, at 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Paragraph (2)(A) of that section states: “An individual. . . shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work” (emphasis added). The “severity regulation” promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for purposes of the program, however, explains to a claimant: “If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience.” 20 CFR §404.1520 (c) (1986) (emphasis added). This regulation, on its very face, directly contradicts the statutory language requiring that a claimant’s age, education, and work experience be considered in a case where the claimant cannot perform his past work. It is thus invalid. The legislative history of § 423(d) confirms that the severity regulation exceeds the Secretary’s statutory authority. Because the Court reverses the Court of Appeals’ judgment that correctly invalidated that regulation, I dissent.
I
A
In its opinion today, the Court analyzes the facial validity of the Secretary’s severity regulation by interpreting § 423(d) *160 in a manner that defeats the intent expressed through its language and structure. The Court isolates paragraph (1)(A) of § 423(d) and finds that the severity regulation does not conflict with the 1954 statutory definition of disability contained therein. Disregarding the fact that this definition was later amended to include paragraph (2) of § 423(d), the Court reaches a premature conclusion that the regulation “is not inconsistent with the statutory definition of disability.” Ante, at 146. After thus reasoning that the “statutory definition of disability” is not a bar to the Secretary’s severity regulation, the Court then characterizes paragraph (2)(A) as merely “limiting] the Secretary’s authority to grant disability benefits, not to deny them.” 1 Ante, at 148. This allows the Court to conclude that there is no reason for the Secretary to consider the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience listed in paragraph (2)(A) in cases where he already has determined that the claimant does not have a severe impairment.
The critical error in the Court’s analysis is readily apparent when one considers the language introducing paragraph (2) of § 423(d). Although the Court purports to set forth § 423(d) (2)(A) in its opinion, ante, at 140, it fails to quote the key language from the statute. The concurring opinion likewise *161 presents an abridged version of the statute. See ante, at 155. Neither places the language that it does quote within its proper context.
Section 423(d) provides in relevant part:
“(1) The term ‘disability’ means —
“(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months; or “(B) in the case of an individual who has attained the age of 55 and is blind ....
“(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A)—
“(A) An individual (except a widow, surviving divorced wife, widower, or surviving divorced husband for purposes of section 402(e) or (f) of this title) shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), ‘work which exists in the national economy’ means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.
“(B) A widow, surviving divorced wife, widower, or surviving divorced husband shall not be determined to be under a disability (for purposes of section 402(e) or (f) of this title) unless his or her physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a level of severity which under regulations prescribed by the Secretary is deemed *162 to be sufficient to. preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful activity.” 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill) (emphasis added).
By employing the phrase “for purposes of paragraph (1)(A)” to introduce paragraph (2), Congress made clear that paragraph (2) serves as an annotation to paragraph (1)(A), not as an independent requirement, as the Court implies. The language and structure of § 423(d) plainly indicate that paragraph (2) is relevant at the time the determination is made under paragraph (1)(A), not afterwards. Paragraph (2), in effect, explains how to determine whether a claimant is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity” within the meaning of paragraph (1)(A). 2
How the determination is to be made in most cases, including those brought by insured workers such as respondent Janet Yuckert, is set forth in paragraph (2)(A), whereas paragraph (2)(B) relates to the category of claims by surviving spouses of insured workers which is specifically excepted from paragraph (2)(A). Whether a claimant under (2)(A) has proved an “inability” to work “by reason of” a medical impair *163 ment for purposes of (1)(A) depends upon whether the impairment limits the worker to such an extent that he is “not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any [other work].”
A straightforward reading of §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A) indicates that the claimant must establish that he has an impairment, that it is medically determinable, that it meets the duration requirement, and that it is severe enough to be disabling within the terms of the statute so as to render him eligible for benefits. Paragraph (1)(A) does not indicate how the Secretary is to assess whether any established medical impairments meet the statutory severity standard. Paragraph (2)(A), however, provides that guidance.
Under paragraph (2)(A), if the claimant is able to do his previous work, the Secretary, of course, need not consider his age, education, and work experience. In such a case, the medically determinable impairment is automatically deemed nonsevere within the meaning of the Act. If, however, the claimant cannot perform his past work, the Secretary then must inquire into the severity of the impairment or combination of impairments. He is to determine whether, in light of the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, the impairment is so severe that the claimant cannot engage in substantial gainful work.
A comparison of this process to that set forth in paragraph (2)(B) leaves no doubt whatsoever that consideration of the vocational factors is a key feature of the process in evaluating claims under paragraph (2)(A). In paragraph (2)(B), Congress authorized the Secretary to deny benefit claims by surviving spouses based on medical evidence alone. That paragraph specifies that the Secretary may promulgate listed severity levels of impairments at which an individual cannot engage in any gainful activity, and may deny benefits in such *164 cases simply by comparison to this list. 3 If Congress had intended to authorize the Secretary to deny benefits in that same manner in disability claims under paragraph (2)(A), without consideration of age, education, or work experience, it would have included the same language in paragraph (2) (A) that it used in paragraph (2)(B).
B
The § 423(d)(2)(A) inquiry furthers the purpose of the disability-benefits program by ensuring an individualized assessment of alleged disability in cases of insured workers. The inquiry takes into account the fact that the same medically determinable impairment affects persons with different vocational characteristics differently. A relatively young, well-educated, and experienced individual who can no longer perform his past work due to a medical impairment may be able to transfer his skills to another job and perform substantial gainful work. That same medical impairment may have a much greater effect on a person’s ability to perform substantial gainful work if the person is of advanced age and has minimal education and limited work experience. Thus, a particular medical impairment may not be disabling for the first individual while it could be for the second.
Despite the clarity of the statutory language and the purpose of individualized disability determinations, the Secretary has promulgated as step two of his step-evaluation process the severity standard set forth in 20 CFR § 404.1520 (c) *165 (1986). Because that regulation prohibits agency adjudicators from considering a claimant’s age, 4 education, and work experience in cases where the claimant cannot perform his past work, the regulation is invalid on its face. 5
*166 The reasoning upon which the Court relies to support its contrary conclusion is unconvincing. Rather than analyze the severity regulation’s validity in light of the actual language and purpose of the statute, the Court relies, ante, at 146, on a description of the Act’s definition of disability set forth in one of its own earlier opinions. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 459-460 (1983) (“The Social Security Act defines ‘disability’ in terms of the effect a physical or mental impairment has on a person’s ability to function in the workplace”). It is important to note, however, that the Court quotes only part of that description. Based on this abbreviated description, the Court views the statute as requiring a “functional approach to determining the effects of medical impairments,” ante, at 146, and regards the regulation as adopting a similar approach.
Merely because both the statute and the regulation require analysis of the effect of the medical impairments on the claimant’s ability to work does not mean, however, that the two are consistent in all respects. Moreover, examination of the description of the statutory scheme, as set forth in Heckler v. Campbell , reveals that the general declaration upon which the Court relies was supported with a discussion of the particulars of the statute that included both paragraphs (1)(A) and (2)(A) of § 423(d). By not including § 423(d)(2)(A) at this step of its analysis, however, the Court avoids the impossible task of explaining how the statutory scheme described in Campbell and the regulatory scheme set forth in the severity regulation can represent “precisely” the same approach when *167 the statutory scheme includes consideration of vocational factors and the regulation does not.
While still focusing on the comparison between the regulation and paragraph (1)(A) read in isolation, the Court states: “If the impairments are not severe enough to limit significantly the claimant’s ability to perform most jobs [apparently referring to 20 CFR §404.1521 (1986)], 6 by definition the impairment does not prevent the claimant from engaging in any substantial gainful activity.” Ante, at 146. Although I agree that a claimant who can perform most jobs is not disabled under the Act, I do not agree with the Court’s implication that the statute authorizes the Secretary to review the medical evidence in a case and, solely on the basis of that information, to determine the claimant’s ability to “perform most jobs.” Under that interpretation of the statute, the agency adjudicators would decide whether a claimant covered by § 423(d)(2)(A) could perform the listed basic-work activities, including responsiveness to supervision and adaptability to change in the workplace, without taking into account the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. I simply cannot read the statutory language of §§ 423(d)(1)(A) *168 and (2)(A) as authorizing the Secretary to permit that determination to be made in such a void.
Even if a medical impairment affected different individuals’ abilities to perform such functions to the same extent, regardless of age, education, and work experience, there is no guidance in the severity regulation as to what constitutes a “significant” limitation on the ability, for example, to use judgment or to adapt to changes in work conditions, or as to how the degree of limitation caused by a medical impairment on such functions is to be determined based solely on medical evidence. Nor does the regulation explain whether the claimant must be able to perform a few, most, or all of the §404.1521 “[ejxamples” of “basic work activities” in order to be found capable of performing “most jobs.” The concurring opinion appears to assume that the Secretary can deny benefits at that stage only if a claimant can perform all the basic work activities listed without any significant limitations. Ante, at 155-156. Assuming this to be true, the regulation does not recognize that less than “significant” limitations on several of the activities in combination could equate with an overall significant limitation on the ability to perform most jobs. In sum, the regulation authorizes disability determinations to be made in a manner inconsistent with the statutory mandate. Congress clearly intended to prohibit these assessments from being made in a vacuum when it specified in § 423(d)(2)(A) that a claimant’s age, education, and work experience be taken into account in determining the effect of his medical impairment on his ability to work. 7
*169 There simply is no support in the language of the statute for the proposition that the Secretary can create his own definition of “severe impairment” for purposes of disability determinations in disabled-worker cases and exclude consideration of factors that Congress directed be considered. Whereas the Court perceives “no reason for the Secretary to consider the claimant’s age, education, and work experience” in cases where a premature showing of nonseverity has been made, ante, at 148, there is one compelling reason for the Secretary to consider those factors — the unambiguous language of the statute directs that he do so.
H
<1
An examination of the legislative history of § 423(d) provides strong additional support for respondent’s position. The disability definition in § 423(d) has its roots in another statutory provision that was first enacted in 1952. In that year, Congress amended the Social Security Act in part to guarantee that the insured status of workers would not be adversely affected if they were permanently and totally disabled for periods of time prior to retirement. As part of this amendment, Congress added to the Act its §216(i), which contains the definition of “disability” and “period of disability” for purposes of that program. 66 Stat. 771 , 42 U. S. C. §416 (i) (1952 ed.). In 1954, Congress replaced those definitions with slightly different ones contained in a new § 216(i). 68 Stat. 1080 , 42 U. S. C. §416® (1952 ed., Supp. IV). When Congress amended the Act in 1956, in part to establish a program to provide benefits for certain insured disabled individuals prior to retirement, it adopted the § 216® definition for purposes of the new program. It added § 223 to the Act which set forth the terms of the new program and included a definition of “disability” nearly identical to that set forth in *170 § 216(i). 8 In 1965, Congress amended that definition to specify that the impairment must be expected to last for not less than 12 months. 79 Stat. 367 .
The statutory definition of disability again was a focus of congressional attention in 1967, when the current structure of the definition was adopted. One of the express aims of the Social Security Act Amendments of that year was to provide a more detailed definition of “disability” for purposes of the disability-insurance benefits program. The definition was set forth in a new § 223(d). 81 Stat. 868 . The congressional Reports explain:
“Paragraph (1) of the new section 223(d) states the basic definition of the term ‘disability’ exactly as it [was] stated in existing law ....
“Paragraph (2)(A) of the new section 223(d) provides that in applying the basic definition (except the special definition for the blind, and except for purposes of widow’s or widower’s insurance benefits on the basis of disability), an individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his impairment or impairments are so severe that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the general area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” S. Rep. No. *171 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 263-264 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 163 (1967). 9
Congress intended that this provision “clarify and amplify the definition of ‘disability’ for purposes of the social security program.” S. Rep. No. 744, at 263; H. R. Rep. No. 544, at 163.
Congress felt the need to clarify the definition of disability because, in its view, the rising cost of the disability-insurance program was due in part to court decisions that had interpreted the definition too broadly. S. Rep. No. 744, at 46-47. In particular, Congress was concerned with decisions that had required agency adjudicators to focus on a narrow geographic area in determining whether a claimant could perform substantial gainful activity and to consider whether there existed specific job vacancies for which the claimant had a reasonable opportunity to be hired. Id., at 47-48 . See, e. g., Tigner v. Gardner, 356 F. 2d 647 (CA5 1966); Wimmer v. Celebrezze, 355 F. 2d 289 (CA4 1966). Congress also noted that questions had arisen about what kind of medical evidence was necessary to “establish the existence and severity of an impairment,” and about what current work performance constituted “substantial gainful activity.” S. Rep. No. 744, at 48.
The new language in § 423(d)(2)(A) was aimed at answering these questions. Congress made it clear- that medical factors, and not local job conditions, are the primary focus in disability cases. It tempered the new restrictiveness of the statute, however, by specifying that consideration of the vocational factors is a necessary component of the disability determination in all cases where a claimant is not working and the medical impairment is not of a level presumed to be disabling, except those expressly exempted from §423 *172 (d)(2)(A). Congress summarized its view of the disability determination process as follows:
“In most cases the decision that an individual is disabled can be made solely on the basis of an impairment, or impairments, which are of a level of severity presumed (under administrative rules) to be sufficient so that, in the absence of an actual demonstration of ability to engage in substantial gainful activity, it may be presumed that the person is unable to so engage because of the impairment or impairments. The language which would be added by the bill specifies the requirements which must be met in order to establish inability to engage in substantial gainful activity for those people with impairments to which the presumption mentioned above does not apply” (emphasis added). S. Rep. No. 744, at 49.
Congress nowhere indicated an intention to authorize the Secretary to deny claims by insured workers not performing previous work based on medical factors alone.
Congress’ intention that the vocational factors be considered in claims by insured workers such as respondent is further illustrated by comparing Congress’ own description of this process with its description of the simpler process it authorized in cases involving claims by disabled surviving spouses. 10 It was explained:
“The bill would also provide benefits ... for certain disabled widows . . . and disabled dependent widowers under a test of disability that is somewhat more restrictive than that for disabled workers and childhood disability beneficiaries. The determination of disability in the case of a widow or widower would be based solely on the level of severity of impairment. Determinations in disabled widow and widower cases would be made without *173 regard to nonmedical factors such as age, education, and work experience, which are considered in disabled worker cases” (emphasis added). Id., at 49-50.
See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 52 (1967). Clearly, the nonmedical factors were considered by Congress to be a key ingredient in disability assessments under § 423(d)(2)(A).
Out of this legislative history surrounding the enactment and amendment of the current disability definition, the Court grasps at three straws. First, it quotes the legislative Reports that accompanied the 1954 amendment to § 216(i) of the Act. Ante, at 147. The record is clear, however, that the 1967 Amendments to § 223 of the Act represent a decision by Congress to set forth new standards governing the severity assessment of medical impairments.
Second, the Court relies upon language from the Senate Report that accompanied the 1967 Amendments. Once again, however, the context is incomplete, for the Court quotes only the remark concerning the “predominant importance of medical factors.” Ante, at 148. There is no question that Congress intended to emphasize that a claimant must produce adequate medical evidence to support his showing of a severe medically determinable impairment. Such an intent, however, is not at odds with Congress’ other clear aim of ensuring that an insured worker’s age, education, and work experience remain relevant factors in the disability determination.
Finally, the Court quotes the 1967 Senate Report’s summary of the overall disability evaluation process which, as the Court points out, contemplated a sequential evaluation. Ante, at 148-149. Expressly included in that sequential evaluation, however, is the consideration of the vocational factors in cases where an insured worker cannot do his previous work. 11
*174 B
To avoid the force of the legislative history contemporaneous with the enactment of §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A), 12 the Court seeks refuge in § 4(b) of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1800 . It claims that by this provision, Congress approved the validity of the severity regulation. Yet § 4(b), on its face, says nothing of the severity level necessary to meet the eligibility requirements. See ante, at 149-151. According to that provision, in making a determination of the medical severity of a claimant’s impairment or impairments, the Secretary cannot simply consider each impairment in isolation but rather must consider the combined effect of the impairments. There thus is no “approval of the severity regulation,” as the Court would say, ante, at 150, in the language of that provision.
The legislative history of the 1984 Act also does not stand as an endorsement of the severity regulation. Each of the three congressional Reports contains a brief description of the general disability-determination process. In each of these descriptions, the preliminary steps of the Secretary’s step-evaluation process were characterized somewhat differently. The Senate Report, see ante, at 151, explained that the new provision requiring consideration of combined impairments would not authorize a departure from the sequential evaluation process. Omitted from the heart of the Court’s quotation, however, is the Report’s express incorporation by reference of the 1967 interpretation. The Report *175 explained: “As the Committee stated in its report on the 1967 amendments, an individual is to be considered eligible ‘only if it is shown that he has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment or impairments.’” S. Rep. No. 98-466, p. 22 (1984) (emphasis added). Reference back to the congressional views supporting the 1967 Amendments evinces an intent to adhere to a consistent interpretation of that provision. For the reasons discussed above, the 1967 view necessarily considered the vocational factors to be a critical part of a disability determination in cases where the insured worker cannot do his previous work. This view stands in contradiction to the Senate Report’s apparent suggestion that the Secretary can deny benefits in such cases based on medical evidence alone. Hence, the Senate’s discussion of the disability determination process is ambiguous at best.
The House Report accompanying the 1984 Act reflects dissatisfaction with the step two severity regulation. According to the House Report, under that process, “a determination that a person is not disabled may be based on a judgment that the person has no impairment, or that the impairment or combination of impairments are slight enough to warrant a presumption that the person’s work ability is not seriously affected.” H. R. Rep. No. 98-618, p. 8 (1984). While stating that it did not wish to undermine the Secretary’s entire step-evaluation process, the House Report nevertheless expressed reservations about the “slight impairment” approach as a threshold assessment at step two. It explained:
“[T]he committee is concerned that the consideration of eligibility for disability benefits be conducted using criteria that clearly reflect the intent of Congress that all those who are unable to work receive benefits. It is of particular concern that the Social Security Administration has been criticized for basing terminations of benefits solely and erroneously on the judgment that the person’s medical impairment is ‘slight,’ according to very *176 strict criteria, and is therefore not disabling, without making any further evaluation of the person’s ability to work.” 7d.,at7.
After stating that it did not wish to eliminate the sequential evaluation process, it continued:
“However, the committee notes that the Secretary has already planned to re-evaluate the current criteria for non-severe impairments [i. e. step two], and urges that all due consideration be given to revising those criteria to reflect the real impact of impairments upon the ability to work” (emphasis added). Id., at 8.
Hence, not only did the House Report read the current step-evaluation process as setting forth a “slight impairment” standard that was less onerous than the standard discussed in the Senate Report, but it also expressed concern that even that threshold step did not provide the necessary individualized consideration of a disability claim to determine the actual impact of the impairment on the individual’s ability to work. The House thus indicated a desire not to upset the Secretary’s step-evaluation process, but it did not approve the step two severity regulation.
The Conference Report adopted the position set forth in the House Report. It referred to the Secretary’s “plan to reevaluate the current criteria for nonsevere impairments” and to the expectation that the Secretary would apprise Congress of the results of that evaluation. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-1039, p. 30 (1984). Moreover, the description of the sequential evaluation process in the Conference Report is even more lenient than the House Report. The conferees approved of the flexibility and efficiency resulting from a threshold disability determination but indicated that
“a determination that an individual is not disabled may be based on a judgment that an individual has no impairment, or that the medical severity of his impairment or combination of impairments is slight enough to warrant a *177 presumption, even without a,full evaluation of vocational factors, that the individual’s ability to perform [substantial gainful activity] is not seriously affected” (emphasis added). Ibid.
The conferees stated that the current sequential evaluation process permitted that determination and they did not intend to eliminate the process. Ibid. This characterization of the process as permitting less than a full evaluation of the vocational factors indicates that the appropriate standard would include an implicit or limited analysis of vocational factors. Because the agency’s regulation states expressly that vocational factors will not be considered, however, the conferees’ statement can serve only as a description of what they believed a valid threshold standard would be, rather than as a description of the current severity regulation.
The ambiguity in the congressional references to step two is understandable due to the fact that Congress did not have before it the question of that regulation’s validity. Examination of the totality of the legislative history of the 1984 Act reveals that Congress limited its focus to several major problems in the Social Security system. These problems included the standard of review for termination of disability benefits, for evaluating pain, for ensuring consideration of multiple impairments, and for evaluating the effect of mental impairments on ability to work.
In sum, Congress acknowledged that the Secretary was in the midst of reevaluating the severity regulation and indicated its willingness to await the Secretary’s results rather than to address the matter in the midst of the overwhelming legislative task it already faced regarding the matters properly before it. The brief remarks about the step-evaluation process simply cannot be read as an endorsement of the facial validity of the severity regulation. These congressional comments in 1984 cannot outweigh the clear language of §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A) and the legislative history of those provisions.
*178 h — < 1 — 1 I — I
The Court makes much of the Secretary s broad authority to prescribe standards for applying the Social Security Act and the limited nature of our review in light of that authority. Ante, at 145. This Court has recognized, however, that “[c]ourts need not defer to an administrative construction of a statute where there are ‘compelling indications that it is wrong.’” Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U. S. 86, 94-95 (1973), quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969). When a regulation is facially inconsistent with the statute, the administrative construction of the statute is necessarily wrong and there is no need to consider further the position of the agency. The Secretary’s interpretation of the statute as reflected in his regulation “cannot supersede the language chosen by Congress.” Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 825 (1980). Unlike the situation presented recently in Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U. S. 368 (1987), Congress unambiguously specified its intent when enacting § 423(d) that the vocational factors be considered in determining disability eligibility in cases such as respondent’s. The efficiency and reliability interests that the Court attributes to the Secretary, 13 ante, at 151-152, cannot outweigh clear congressional intent.
The Secretary attempts to avoid the facial contradiction between his severity regulation and the statute by interpreting the regulation as representing only a de minimis threshold standard. The Secretary apparently has recognized finally what every Federal Court of Appeals has concluded— application of a threshold severity regulation that is greater *179 than de minimis is invalid under the terms of the statute. See concurring opinion ante, at 156, and nn. 1 and 2.
The Court explains that it has not considered the validity of the Secretary’s application of the regulation, ante, at 150, n. 8, although it appears to adopt the “slight” impairment interpretation. See ante, at 153. In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor expressly imposes on the severity regulation a narrowing interpretation that permits only a de minimis threshold standard.
I cannot, however, join that approach in this case. I agree with respondent’s position that, although a de minimis standard that implicitly draws the vocational factors into the disability determination may be permitted under the statute, this Court cannot resolve that question on the record in this ease. Such a standard was not applied by the agency adjudicators who reviewed respondent’s claim, and there is no record evidence as to the Secretary’s application of a de minimis standard subsequent to the 1978 adoption of the sequential evaluation. Indeed, Justice O’Connor aptly demonstrates that even if the Secretary is currently attempting to readopt the pre-1978 slight impairment standard, that standard is entirely inconsistent with the interpretation in effect at the time respondent’s claim was considered by the agency adjudicators. I agree with Justice O’Connor that the evidence suggests that step two has been “applied systematically in a manner inconsistent with the statute.” Ante, at 157; see also Stone v. Heckler, 752 F. 2d 1099 (CA5 1985). Little weight can be given to views of an agency when the views themselves are inconsistent. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 858, n. 25 (1975).
Whether a de minimis threshold standard is authorized under the statute is not before this Court. The regulation on its face simply does not describe a standard that incorporates into the threshold step an implicit consideration of the vocational factors. The language of step two does not represent *180 a standard that denies disability claims only if the medical impairment is so minimal that no set of vocational factors, even if fully considered, could result in a finding of disability. Yet, in order to be valid under the terms of the statute, any de minimis threshold step would have to adopt such a standard. It would have to ensure that it did not preclude an individual evaluation of vocational factors at a later stage 14 and a finding of disability if they affect the ultimate determination of that issue.
I agree with the approach of the Court of Appeals in this case. Contrary to this Court’s implications, ante, at 147, that court did not address the question whether the statute authorizes a threshold showing of medical severity. The Court of Appeals addressed only the facial validity of the severity standard in step two of the sequential evaluation process. It expressly declined to consider whether other threshold severity standards, such as a de minimis standard, would be authorized under the statute. See Yuckert v. Heckler, 774 F. 2d 1365, 1369, n. 6 (CA9 1985). Invalidating step two does not prohibit the adoption of a threshold screening stand *181 ard to eliminate frivolous claims at an early stage in the process if that standard takes into account vocational factors as required by the statute. Adoption of such a standard should take place through the administrative procedures required under the Act for the adoption of new regulations. See 42 U. S. C. §421 (k)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Further agency interpretations of the invalid regulation are of no value. They cannot alter the fact that the regulation is facially invalid.
IV
Because the Secretary’s regulation directly conflicts with the statutory language set forth by Congress and because it plainly is inconsistent with the legislative history, it is highly inappropriate for this Court to permit the Secretary to continue to enforce that regulation. I dissent.
The Court implies that the statute limits the Secretary’s ability to grant disability-insurance benefits but does not limit his ability to deny such benefits. This implication is inconsistent with the fact that the disability-insurance benefits program at issue here creates a statutory entitlement for those persons eligible under the statutory criteria. Section 423 begins by stating that every individual who is insured, is not of retirement age, has filed an application, and is disabled, “shall be entitled to a disability insurance benefit” during the time period deemed appropriate under the standards set forth in the statute (emphasis added). 42 U. S. C. § 423 (a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. III). The Court elsewhere takes note of the fact that claimants, such as respondent, who seek disability-insurance payments due to inability to continue working have contributed to the insurance program. Ante, at 140. As under any insurance program, a contributor to the plan is entitled to payment if he or she meets the agreed-upon terms for coverage.
This interpretation is strongly reinforced by 42 U. S. C. § 416 (i). That section provides a definition of “disability” and “period of disability” for various other sections of the statute. It states in relevant part:
“(1) Except for purposes of sections 402(d), 402(e), 402(f), 423, and 425 of this title, the term ‘disability’ means (A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months, or (B) blindness .... The provisions of paragraphs (2)(A), (2)(C), (3), (4), (5), and (6) of section 423(d) of this title shall be applied for purposes of determining whether an individual is under a disability within the meaning of the first sentence of this paragraph in the same manner as they are applied for purposes of paragraph (1) of such section.’’ (Emphasis added.) 42 U. S. C. §416 (i)(l) (1982 ed., Supp. III).
Clearly, Congress intended that paragraph (2)(A) of § 423(d) be applied for purposes of determining whether a claimant is under a disability within the meaning of paragraph (1)(A) of § 423(d).
In the regulations pertaining to surviving spouses, the Secretary explains to claimants: “To determine whether you are disabled, we consider only your physical or mental impairment. We do not consider your age, education and work experience.” 20 CFR §404.1577 (1986). He further explains that the claimant will be found to be disabled only if he is not doing any substantial gainful activity and his impairment meets the requirements of an impairment listed in an accompanying appendix. See § 404.1578; see also Hansen v. Heckler, 783 F. 2d 170, 172 (CA10 1986) (statutory criteria for disability benefit claims by widows are more restrictive than standard applicable to claims by insured wage earners).
Perhaps the most disturbing result of the step two severity regulation is the disproportionate effect that its application has had on claimants in the older age categories. Some of the amici express concern that the Court realize that the instant ease, which involves a claim by a relatively young and well-educated individual, is not typical of cases in which step two has operated to deny benefits to eligible claimants. See Brief for American Diabetes Association et al. as Amici Curiae 9, n. 5,12-13; Brief for American Association of Retired Persons as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 13. A survey of a significant number of reported cases reveals that in those cases the claimants whose step two severity denials were reversed by the courts were individuals age 50 or older. See id., at 16, n. 12. In one of its earliest statements as to why the vocational factors must be considered in making disability determinations, the Secretary explained that “[t]he aging process makes itself felt with respect to healing, prognosis, physiological degeneration, psychological adaptability and, in consequence, on vocational capacity.” 1955 Disability Freeze State Manual §325B. Noting that chronological age, however, was only “some indication of the individual’s physiological age,” the Secretary specified that “the impact of the aging process upon the specific individual will have to be considered in connection with the particular impairment claimed to prevent substantial gainful activity. ” Ibid. Elimination of the age factor from the disability calculus at step two inevitably diminishes the reliability of the determinations at that step.
Although the Court peremptorily finds “no basis” for holding that the severity regulation is inconsistent on its face with the statute, ante, at 147, no less than five Federal Courts of Appeals, including the court below, have found the same blatant contradiction in the plain language that I find. See Brown v. Heckler, 786 F. 2d 870, 871 (CA8 1986) (citing Courts of Appeals that have “point[ed] out that while the provision [in the severity regulation] explicitly requires the Secretary to disregard the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, the Act expressly requires those factors to be taken into account when determining disability”); Hansen v. Heckler, 783 F. 2d, at 174 (“regulation on its face . . . conflicts with the statutory directive” which is “to consider a claimant’s ability both to perform past work and, given individual vocational factors, to engage in other work”); Johnson v. Heckler, 769 F. 2d 1202, 1212 (CA7 1985) (“[0]n its face, the step two severity regulation conflicts with *166 the Social Security Act’s purposes and the plain language of the statute’s definitions of disability”), cert. pending sub nom. Bowen v. Johnson , No. 85-1442; Baeder v. Heckler, 768 F. 2d 547, 553 (CA3 1985) (severity regulation cannot be analyzed “except according to its plain language and the manner in which the Secretary uses it”; “[a]s it stands,. . . [it] is inconsistent with the Social Security Act, and therefore, is invalid”). Obviously, these cases do not support the assertion in the concurring opinion that the courts rested their judgments on “frustration ... in dealing with the Secretary’s application of step two.” Ante, at 157.
In § 404.1521, the Secretary explains what he means by “an impairment that is not severe”:
“(a) Non-severe impairment(s). An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
“(b) Basic work activities. When we talk about basic work activities, we mean the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. Examples of these include—
“(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
“(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
“(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
“(4) Use of judgment;
“(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and
“(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court is correct in asserting that “[i]f a claimant is unable to show that he has a medically severe impairment, he is not eligible for disability benefits.” Ante, at 148. I disagree, however, with its conclusion, drawn from that assertion, that “[i]n such a case, there is no reason for the Secretary to consider the claimant’s age, education, and work experience.” Ibid. This reasoning begs the very question presented for resolution today — whether the severity of a claimant’s medical impairment can be discerned without reference to the individual’s age, education, and work experience. The statute expressly answers this question in the negative.
That definition stated:
“The term ‘disability’ means inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration. An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such proof of the existence thereof as may be required.” 70 Stat. 815 -816, 42 U. S. C. § 423 (c)(2) (1952 ed., Supp. IV).
Section 223(d)(2)(A) was in the original House bill. Although it was in the bill recommended out of Committee in the Senate, it was deleted by-amendment on the floor. The Conference Committee restored the provision and the Senate accepted it. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 51-52 (1967).
Paragraph (2)(B), which sets forth the method of determining disability eligibility for disabled surviving spouses, was also added by the 1967 Amendments. 81 Stat. 868 .
At various points in its opinion, the Court implies that the issue before the Court is the validity of the Secretary’s sequential evaluation process. Respondent, however, has not challenged the validity of that process. I agree that Congress foresaw that there would be various steps in the dis *174 ability determination process at which a claimant could be deemed ineligible. In Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458 (1983), the Court upheld a significant part of the sequential evaluation process, but step two was not before it in that case and in fact was not even mentioned in the description of the current process.
The only substantive amendment to these sections since 1967 was in 1983 when § 423(d)(2) was amended to substitute “widower, or surviving divorced husband” for “or widower” throughout that paragraph. 97 Stat. 117 .
The extensive litigation concerning the meaning of step two belies the assertion that it fosters efficiency. See ante at 145, n. 4. Justice O’ConnoR describes the evidence indicating that step two has proved to be a very unreliable indicator of disability eligibility. See ante, at 157-158.
While a clearly drafted regulation encompassing a valid preliminary screening standard undoubtedly could increase efficiency and reliability, the current step two advances neither.
Application of a greater than de minimis threshold severity standard can render the step-evaluation process internally inconsistent by denying benefits to claimants who would be found to be disabled under the criteria of a more advanced step in the sequential evaluation process. For example, under the medical-vocational guidelines that are applied at step five, the only impairments that will never be found to be disabling regardless of age, education, and work experience, are those that do not prevent the claimant from engaging in heavy work and do not impose nonexertional restrictions. Yet persons who are unable to perform heavy work have been found to be not disabled at step two at the administrative level, and the courts have had to reverse those initial findings. See Brief for American Diabetes Association et al. as Amici Curiae 8, 13-14 (profiling eases). The Secretary also has argued in the past that even if a claimant’s impairment meets the requirements in the Listing of Impairments used at step three of the process and would have been found to be disabling at that step, that fact is irrelevant if the claimant is found to be not disabled at the threshold step two standard. See Williamson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 796 F. 2d 146, 150 (CA6 1986).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9431011. Public record. Not legal advice.