# MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County

> Supreme Court of the United States · September 3, 1986 · 477 U.S. 340

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430613

## Case

- **Full name:** MacDONALD, SOMMER & FRATES v. COUNTY OF YOLO Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** September 3, 1986
- **Citations:** 477 U.S. 340; 106 S. Ct. 2561; 91 L. Ed. 2d 285; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 119
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Rehnquist
- **Judges:** Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor, White, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist
- **Cited by:** 514 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430613

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the property owner, who alleged a “taking” claim, had not met the finality requirement, even though the planning commission denied the landowner’s sole subdivision proposal and the county board of supervisors affirmed because the tentative subdivision map was i…
- explaining that “[a] court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone ‘too far’ until it knows how far the regulation goes,” which requires “a final and authoritative determination” of how the regulation will be applied to the property in question
- holding that court could not determine whether a “taking” had occurred in absence of final and authoritative determination by county, even though county planning commission rejected plaintiffs proposal to subdivide property
- holding that an “essential prerequisite” to the assertion of a takings claim “is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property”
- stating that the Court has uniformly insisted on determining “the nature and extent of permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it.”

## Opinion text

Justice Rehnquist,
with whom Justice Powell joins, dissenting.
I agree with Justice White that the Court of Appeal’s opinion is best read as rejecting appellant’s allegations as a matter of substantive takings law; that appellant sufficiently alleged a final decision denying it all beneficial use of its property; that a land use regulation restricting the use of property may amount to a taking; and that the allegations here are sufficient to state a takings claim. Accordingly, I join Parts I, II, and III of his dissenting opinion. As Justice White recognizes in Part IV of his opinion, the questions surrounding what compensation, if any, is due a property owner in the context of “interim” takings are multifaceted and difficult. I would not reach these questions without first permitting the courts below to address them in light of the fact that appellant has sufficiently alleged a taking.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430613. Public record. Not legal advice.