# United States v. Inadi > Supreme Court of the United States · March 10, 1986 · 475 U.S. 387 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430384 ## Case - **Full name:** United States v. Inadi - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** March 10, 1986 - **Citations:** 475 U.S. 387; 54 U.S.L.W. 4258; 106 S. Ct. 1121; 89 L. Ed. 2d 390; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 31 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Marshall - **Judges:** Powell, Burger, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Marshall, Brennan - **Cited by:** 562 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Limited by State v. Williams, 2005 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 49 (2005). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430384 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - recognizing the admission of nonhearsay statements raises no Confrontation Clause *1341 concerns, and noting that certain taped conversations could be admitted without violating the Clause if not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted, but rather as background for … - holding that language in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) that unavailability is always a requirement can not be read too broadly so as to apply to all possible hearsay exceptions; court found unavailability was not a requirement in the admis… - holding that language in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980 - stating with regards to former testimony that "[ilf the declarant is available and the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony ... there is little justification for relying on the weaker version" - holding that the Confrontation Clause does not require a showing of unavailability as a condition precedent to the admission of the out-of-court statements of a non-testifying co-conspirator ## Opinion text Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joins, dissenting. With respect to the case before us, the majority takes but a small step. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), the Court held: “[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’” Id., at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion)). The majority now assures us that “[t]he reliability of the out-of-court statements is not at issue in this case.” Ante, at 391, n. 3. Respondent is thus free to return to the Court of Appeals and argue that the *401 co-conspirator declarations admitted against him lack the “in-dicia of reliability” demanded by the Confrontation Clause. 1 With respect to its constitutional analysis, however, the majority makes a giant leap. Even while conceding that the “ ‘very mission’ ” of the Confrontation Clause is to “ ‘advance “the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials,””’ ante, at 396 (citations omitted), the Court today holds that the Clause is not offended when the prosecution fails to make even the slightest effort to produce for cross-examination the authors of the out-of-court statements with which it hopes to convict a defendant. Because I cannot share the majority’s implicit faith that the camaraderie of a criminal conspiracy can substitute for in-court cross-examination to guarantee the reliability of conspiratorial statements, I can neither accept the majority’s analysis nor stand silent while the values embodied in the Sixth Amendment are so cavalierly subordinated to prosecutorial efficiency. i — i t — l At bottom, today’s decision rests upon the Court’s judgment that a defendant’s constitutional interest in subjecting the extrajudicial declarations of co-conspirators to the cross-examination that has traditionally been the primary guarantee of reliability in trials must be subordinated to considerations of prosecutorial efficiency. I do not believe the concerns of the Confrontation Clause should be so easily disregarded. The plight of Sir Walter Raleigh, condemned on the deposition of an alleged accomplice who had since recanted, may have loomed large in the eyes of those who drafted that constitutional guarantee. See F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment 104 (1951); Stephen, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in 2 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 172 (4th series 1919). But the Framers, had they the prescience, would surely have been as apprehensive of the spectacle of a defendant’s conviction upon the testimony of a handful of surveillance technicians and a very large box of tapes recording the boasts, faulty recollections, and coded or ambiguous utterances of outlaws. The Court’s decision helps clear the way for this spectacle to become a common occurrence. I dissent. Today’s decision does nothing to resolve the conflict among the lower courts as to whether declarations of co-conspirators who are not present in court for cross-examination must be shown to have particularized “indicia of reliability” before they can be admitted for substantive purposes against a criminal defendant. Compare United States v. DeLuna, 763 F. 2d 897 (CA8 1985) (particularized inquiry into reliability of co-conspirator statements demanded in addition to unavailability requirement); United States v. Ordonez, 722 F. 2d 530, 535 (CA9 1983) (particularized assessment of reliability needed for every statement admitted under co-conspirator hearsay exemption); United States v. Perez, 702 P. 2d 33 (CA2) (same), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1108 (1983), with Boone v. Marshall, 760 F. 2d 117, 119 (CA6 1985) (declaration admitted under co-conspirator exemption “automatically satisfies the Sixth Amendment requirements”); United States v. Molt, 758 F. 2d 1198 (CA7 1985) (same); Ottomano v. United States, 468 F. 2d 269, 273 (CA1 1972) (same), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1128 (1973). See Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 323 , 361-362, and nn. 131-132 (1984). I realize that this was not the case here. However, the Court’s holding addresses all cases involving co-conspirator declarations and thus extends to all the hypotheticals I discuss. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430384. Public record. Not legal advice.