# United States v. Bagley

> Supreme Court of the United States · July 2, 1985 · 473 U.S. 667

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430190

## Case

- **Full name:** United States v. Bagley
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** July 2, 1985
- **Citations:** 473 U.S. 667; 53 U.S.L.W. 5084; 105 S. Ct. 3375; 87 L. Ed. 2d 481; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 130
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by White
- **Judges:** Blackmun, Burger, White, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, Powell
- **Cited by:** 7,795 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (1986).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 2
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430190

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that materiality after being warned by the judge that this would open the door to hostile exists when “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been evidence and after consulting with B owling himself. Bowling gives no disclosed to the defense, the r…
- reasoning the prosecutor's failure to disclose any monetary inducements, as well as its disclosure of affidavits stating the witnesses received no promises of a reward, misled the defendant to believe that the witnesses could not be impeached when, in actuality, "the possibili…
- holding that the prosecution’s failure to disclose before trial that federal agents had contracted to pay the witnesses for information and testimony against the defendant was constitutional error only if there was a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding wo…
- finding that a failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence results in constitutional error regardless of whether the defendant requested production of such evidence, and determining that the proper standard for evaluating suppressed evidence was whether it suggested a "r…
- holding that whether the prosecutorial failure to disclose was the result of no request, a general request, or even a specific request, "[t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the…

## Opinion text

*685 Justice White,
with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that respondent is not entitled to have his conviction overturned unless he can show that the evidence withheld by the Government was “material,” and I therefore join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion. I also agree with Justice Blackmun that for purposes of this inquiry, “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Ante, at 682. As the Justice correctly observes, this standard is “sufficiently flexible” to cover all instances of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused. Ibid. Given the flexibility of the standard and the inherently fact-bound nature of the cases to which it will be applied, however, I see no reason to attempt to elaborate on the relevance to the inquiry of the specificity of the defense’s request for disclosure, either generally or with respect to this case. I would hold simply that the proper standard is one of reasonable probability and that the Court of Appeals’ failure to apply this standard necessitates reversal. I therefore concur in the judgment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430190. Public record. Not legal advice.