# Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City > Supreme Court of the United States · June 28, 1985 · 473 U.S. 172 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430153 ## Case - **Full name:** WILLIAMSON COUNTY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION Et Al. v. HAMILTON BANK OF JOHNSON CITY - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 28, 1985 - **Citations:** 473 U.S. 172; 53 U.S.L.W. 4969; 105 S. Ct. 3108; 87 L. Ed. 2d 126; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 87 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brennan - **Judges:** Blackmun, Burger, Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Stevens, White, Powell - **Cited by:** 2,483 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). - Negative treatments: 2 - Distinguished by: 5 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430153 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that an as-applied takings claim against a municipality’s enforcement of a zoning ordinance is not ripe until (1) “the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property … - explaining that “[t]he finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decision maker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual concrete injury” while exhaustion “generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an … - holding that “[a]s the Court has made- clear in several recent decisions, a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decisi… - explaining, in the just compensation context, that “the State’s action is not ‘complete’ in the sense of causing a constitutional injury ‘unless or until the State fails to provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the property loss’” (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. … - holding that claims for compensation under the Fifth Amendment takings clause are not ripe until (1) the relevant governmental unit has reached a final decision as to what will be done with the property and (2) the plaintiff has sought compensation for the alleged taking throu… ## Opinion text *201 Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring. The Court today discusses two methods for analyzing the constitutional injury that may result from the temporary application of government regulations denying property any economically viable use. The Court concludes that, under either approach, the respondent’s claim is premature because the petitioner Williamson County Regional Planning Commission’s 1981 disapproval of the respondent’s preliminary plat did not constitute a final reviewable decision given the availability of a variance procedure that the respondent did not pursue. Ante, at 185, 199-200. I join the Court’s opinion without, however, departing from my views set forth in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because “[i]nvalidation unaccompanied by payment of damages would hardly compensate the landowner for any economic loss suffered during the time his property was taken,” I believe that “once a court establishes that there was a regulatory ‘taking,’ the Constitution demands that the government entity pay just compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the ‘taking,’ and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.” Id., at 653, 655 . As the Court demonstrates in this case, however, “the Commission’s denial of approval does not conclusively determine whether respondent will be denied all reasonable beneficial use of its property, and therefore is not a final, reviewable decision.” Ante, at 194. In addition, “Respondent has not shown that [Tennessee’s] inverse condemnation procedure is unavailable or inadequate, and until it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is premature.” Ante, at 196-197. Accordingly, I join the Court’s opinion reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430153. Public record. Not legal advice.