# Mitchell v. Forsyth

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 19, 1985 · 472 U.S. 511

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430107

## Case

- **Full name:** Mitchell v. Forsyth
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 19, 1985
- **Citations:** 472 U.S. 511; 53 U.S.L.W. 4798; 2 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 221; 105 S. Ct. 2806; 86 L. Ed. 2d 411; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 113
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Burger
- **Judges:** White, Blackmun, Burger, O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Powell, Rehnqutst, Rehnquist
- **Cited by:** 8,308 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 4
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430107

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that some orders denying summary judgment constitute “ ‘final decisions’ ” under the collateral order doctrine
- stating that, “[w]hen a district court has denied a defendant’s claim of right not to stand trial, on double jeopardy grounds, for example, we have consistently held the court’s decision appealable, for such a right cannot be effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred…
- holding that a claim of qualified immunity is separable from the merits of the underlying claim because “[a]n appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant’s claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts, nor even determine…
- holding that a state official may bring an interlocutory appeal when his or her qualified immunity defense is rejected at the summary judgment stage because “[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it i…
- stating that in Harlow the Supreme Court “purged qualified immunity doctrine of its subjective components” and that under Harlow an official is “entitled to immunity so long as his actions do not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reason…

## Opinion text

Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in part.
With Justice O’Connor, I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court’s opinion and the judgment of the Court. I also agree that the Court’s discussion of the absolute immunity issue is unnecessary for the resolution of this case. I write separately to emphasize my agreement with Justice Stevens that the Court’s extended discussion of this issue reaches the wrong conclusion.
In Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972), we held that aides of Members of Congress who implement the legislative policies and decisions of the Member enjoy the same absolute immunity from suit under the Speech and Debate Clause that the Members themselves enjoy. As I noted in dissent in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 822 (1982), the logic underlying Gravel applies equally to top Executive aides. A Cabinet officer — and surely none more than the Attorney General — is an “aide” and arm of the President in *537 the execution of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” It is an astonishing paradox that the aides of the 100 Senators and 435 Representatives share the absolute immunity of the Member, but the President’s chief aide in protecting internal national security does not. I agree that the petitioner was entitled to absolute immunity for actions undertaken in his exercise of the discretionary power of the President in the area of national security.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9430107. Public record. Not legal advice.
