# Anderson v. City of Bessemer City > Supreme Court of the United States · March 19, 1985 · 470 U.S. 564 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429951 ## Case - **Full name:** Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** March 19, 1985 - **Citations:** 470 U.S. 564; 53 U.S.L.W. 4314; 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1; 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,058; 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 396; 105 S. Ct. 1504; 84 L. Ed. 2d 518; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 69 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Blackmun - **Judges:** White, Burger, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Con-Nor, Blackmun - **Cited by:** 10,897 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Criticized by Philbrook v. Ansonia Board Of Education, 925 F.2d 47 (1991). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 2 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429951 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that factual findings may not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous, and that “when a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that… - stating that when factual findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s findings because the trial court had the opportunity to note variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear… - finding that the reviewing court "may not reverse [the district court's account of the evidence] even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently ... [such that] a district court's choice between two permissibl… - explaining that where two differing in- terpretations are neither illogical or implausible and each interpre- tation “has support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record; and if either interpretation has been drawn by a [trial] court[,]” a court of review c… - explaining that “factors other than demeanor and inflection go into the decision whether or not to believe a witness,” including “[d]ocuments or objective evidence [that] may contradict the witness’[s] story” or an account that is “so internally inconsistent or implausible on … ## Opinion text Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment. I would like to join the Court’s opinion, for I think its judgment is correct, and I agree with most of what the Court *582 says. I, however, do not join the broad dictum, ante, at 573-574, to the effect that the same result is to be reached when the district court’s findings are based wholly on documentary evidence and do not rest at all on credibility determinations. In the past, I have joined at least one opinion that, generally, is to the opposite effect. See United States v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 285 F. 2d 381, 388 (CA8 1960). See also Ralston Purina Co. v. General Foods Corp., 442 F. 2d 389, 391 (CA8 1971); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co., 540 F. 2d 927, 930 (CA8 1976); Swanson v. Baker Industries, Inc., 615 F. 2d 479, 483 (CA8 1980). While the Court may be correct in its dictum today, certainly this case does not require us to decide the question. The record contains far more than documentary evidence, as the Court’s opinion so adequately discloses. In a case that requires resolution of the question, I might eventually be persuaded that the Court’s approach is wise. I.prefer, however, to wait for a case where the issue must be resolved and where it has been briefed and argued by the parties, rather than to address the issue by edict without these customary safeguards. I therefore join the Court only in its judgment and not in its opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429951. Public record. Not legal advice.