# Smith v. Robinson

> Supreme Court of the United States · July 5, 1984 · 468 U.S. 992

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429771

## Case

- **Full name:** SMITH Et Al. v. ROBINSON, RHODE ISLAND ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** July 5, 1984
- **Citations:** 468 U.S. 992; 52 U.S.L.W. 5179; 104 S. Ct. 3457; 82 L. Ed. 2d 746; 1984 U.S. LEXIS 155
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Brennan
- **Judges:** Blackmun, Burger, White, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens
- **Cited by:** 918 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 1
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429771

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that "fees are not properly awarded for work done on a claim on which a plaintiff did not prevail and which involved distinctly different facts and legal theories from the claims on the basis of which relief was awarded” (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-…
- concluding that because the Education of the Handicapped Act permitted aggrieved individuals to invoke carefully tailored local administrative procedures followed by federal judicial review, Congress could not have intended individuals to bypass the enumerated procedure and ad…
- recognizing there is some confusion among the circuit courts as to the availability of damages under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and, without expressing an opinion on the matter, noting that courts generally agree damages are available for violations of § 504
- holding that the "comprehensive scheme” of the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA”) precludes § 1983 suits based on violations of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause because they are nearly identical to EHA claims
- holding that, because the IDEA’s predecessor statute lacked an attorneys’ fees provision, such awards could not be obtained by enforcing education-related rights through other civil rights statutes that permitted awards

## Opinion text

Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
In this case we are called upon to analyze the interaction among five statutory provisions: § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of *1022 1871, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 ; §2 of the Civil Rights Attorney's Pees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 ; §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794 ; § 505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 794a(b); and § 615(e)(2) of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA or Act), as added, 89 Stat. 789 , 20 U. S. C. § 1415 (e)(2).
Section 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” (Emphasis added.)
And §1988 provides that the prevailing party in an action prosecuted under § 1983 may be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees. Similarly, §§ 504 and 505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act provide a cause of action and attorney’s fees, respectively, to an individual who, “solely by reason of his handicap,” has been “excluded from the participation in, ... denied the benefits of, . . . [or] subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Finally, § 615(e)(2) of the EHA authorizes judicial review of the States’ provision of “free appropriate public education” to handicapped children. Unlike 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, however, § 615(e)(2) has no counterpart in the EHA authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties.
Petitioners challenge Rhode Island’s discriminatory failure to afford Thomas F. Smith III access to certain educational programs made available to other handicapped children. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 1006, 1007, 1008-1009, this challenge states a meritorious claim under the EHA and a *1023 substantial claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, petitioners’ claim appears to fall squarely within the terms of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Consequently, if §§504 and 1983 are available as bases for petitioners’ action, petitioners are entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees under § 1988 and, at a minimum, to be given an opportunity to establish the meritoriousness of their § 504 claim. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122 (1980); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 4, n. 7 (1976); Brief for Petitioners 61-62, n. 26 (legislative history establishes that § 505(b) incorporates standards governing § 1988). 1
To determine whether §504 or §1983 is available, each provision must be read together with the EHA. 2 As the Court demonstrates, in enacting the EHA, Congress surely intended that individuals with claims covered by that Act *1024 would pursue relief through the administrative channels that the Act established before seeking redress in court. See ante, at 1009-1013, 1016-1019. It would make little sense for Congress to have established such a detailed and comprehensive administrative system and yet allow individuals to bypass the system, at their option, by bringing suits directly to the courts under either § 504 or § 1983. To that extent, therefore, the statutes before us are in conflict with one another. Accordingly, our guide must be the familiar principle of statutory construction that conflicting statutes should be interpreted sb as to give effect to each but to allow a later enacted, more specific statute to amend an earlier, more general statute only to the extent of the repugnancy between the two statutes. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 267 (1981); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 153 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). We must, therefore, construe the statutory provisions at issue here so as to promote the congressional intent underlying the EHA, which was enacted after §§504 and 1983 and which is addressed specifically to the problems facing handicapped schoolchildren. At the same time, however, we must preserve those aspects of §§ 504 and 1983 that are not in irreconcilable conflict with the EHA.
The natural resolution of the conflict between the EHA, on the one hand, and §§504 and 1983, on the other, is to require a plaintiff with a claim covered by the EHA to pursue relief through the administrative channels established by that Act before seeking redress in the courts under § 504 or § 1983. Under this resolution, the integrity of the EHA is preserved entirely, and yet §§504 and 1983 are also preserved to the extent that they do not undermine the EHA. Although the primary function of §§ 504 and 1983 is to provide direct access to the courts for certain types of claims, these provisions also operate, as this case demonstrates, to identify those types of causes of action for which Congress has authorized the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties. Significantly, this *1025 function does not in any way conflict with the goals or operation of the EHA. There is no basis, therefore, for concluding that either § 504 or § 1983 is unavailable for this limited purpose.
The Court, however, has responded to the conflict among these statutes by restricting the applicability of §§504 and 1983 far more than is necessary to resolve their inconsistency. Indeed, the Court holds that both §§504 and 1983 are wholly unavailable to individuals seeking to secure their rights to a free appropriate public education, despite the fact that the terms and intent of Congress in enacting each of these provisions unquestionably extend to many of those claims. As a result, the Court finds that attorney’s fees, which would otherwise be available to those individuals under §§ 505(b) and 1988, are now unavailable. Yet the Court recognizes that there is absolutely no indication in the language of the EHA or in the Act’s legislative history that Congress meant to effect such a repeal, let alone any indication that Congress specifically intended to bar the recovery of attorney’s fees for parties that prevail in this type of action. The Court’s rationale for effectively repealing §§504, 505(b), 1983, and 1988 to the extent that they cover petitioners’ claim is that the comprehensiveness and detail with which the EHA addresses the problem of providing schooling to handicapped children implies that Congress intended to repeal all other remedies that overlap with the EHA, even if they do not conflict with the EHA. 3
*1026 Repeals by implication, however, are strongly disfavored. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U. S. 772, 788 (1981); Morton v. Mancari, supra, at 550 ; Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). And, as stated above, they are tolerated only to the extent necessary to resolve clear repugnancy between statutes. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra, at 154; Posadas v. National City Bank, supra, at 503. The function that §§ 504 and 1983 perform of identifying those claims for which attorney’s fees are authorized under §§ 505(b) and 1988 is not repugnant to the EHA. The Court therefore has erred in concluding that petitioners cannot obtain attorney’s fees.
In cases like this, it is particularly important that the Court exercise restraint in concluding that one Act of Congress implicitly repeals another, not only to avoid misconstruction of the law effecting the putative repeal, but also to preserve the intent of later Congresses that have already enacted laws that are dependent on the continued applicability of the law whose implicit repeal is in question. By failing to exercise such restraint here, and hence concluding that the EHA implicitly repealed, in part, §§504 and 1983, the Court has not only misconstrued the congressional intent underlying the EHA, it has also frustrated Congress’ intent in enacting §§ 505(b) and 1988 — each of which was enacted after the EHA and premised on a view of §§ 504 and 1983 that was significantly more expansive than that offered by the Court today. Although in enacting the EHA, Congress was silent with respect to the continued availability of §§504 and 1983 for claims that could be brought directly under the EHA, there can be no doubt that, at the time §§ 505(b) and 1988 were passed, Congress believed that the EHA had not eliminated these alternative remedies. Congressional understanding at these later points certainly sheds light on Congress’ earlier intent in enacting the EHA, but perhaps more importantly, it demonstrates the extent to which the Court’s finding of an implicit repeal has undermined the congressional intent behind the enactment of §§ 505(b) and 1988.
*1027 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) promulgated regulations under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act after the EHA was passed. Those regulations contained a lengthy subpart governing the provision of education to the handicapped stating: “A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program shall provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped person who is in the recipient’s jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person’s handicap.” 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 , 22682 (1977). Thus, the Department charged with enforcing the Rehabilitation Act and the EHA did not understand the latter to repeal the former with respect to handicapped education. 4 And, of course, the interpretation of the Act by the agency responsible for its enforcement is entitled to great deference. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 434 (1971). Furthermore, Congress was very much aware of HEW’s interpretation of the two Acts. During oversight hearings on the Rehabilitation Act, held after the enactment of the EHA, representatives of HEW testified that the agency had recently promulgated regulations under § 504 and that those regulations addressed discrimination in the provision of education to handicapped children. 5 Hearings on Implementation of Section 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 296-297 (1977) (statement of David Tatel, Director, *1028 Office for Civil Rights, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare); 6 Hearings on the Rehabilitation of the Handicapped Programs, 1976, before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1498, 1499, 1508, 1539-1546 (1976) (statement of Martin H. Gerry, Director, Office for Civil Rights, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). No member of the House or Senate Subcommittee raised any question regarding § 504’s continued coverage of discrimination in education after the passage of the EHA.
Indeed, the Senate Report accompanying the bill that included § 505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act explicitly referred to, and approved, the regulations promulgated under § 504. The Report then went on to address the need for attorney’s fees, referring to the rights that §504 extended to handicapped individuals generally and intimating no exception for handicapped children seeking education. S. Rep. No. 95-890, pp. 19-20 (1978).
Similarly, the House Report stated:
“The proposed amendment is not in any way unique. At present there are at least 90 separate attorney’s fees provisions to promote enforcement of over 90 different *1029 Federal laws. In fact, disabled individuals are one of the very few minority groups in this country who have not been authorized by the Congress to seek attorney’s fees. The amendment proposes to correct this omission and thereby assist handicapped individuals in securing the legal protection guaranteed them under title V of the Act.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1149, p. 21 (1978).
Neither the terms nor the logic of this statement admits of the possibility that Congress intended to exclude from the coverage of § 505(b) the claims of handicapped children seeking a free appropriate public education.
Finally, although Congress, in enacting § 1988, did not specifically refer to the applicability of § 1983 to constitutional claims by handicapped children seeking education, it clearly intended to authorize attorney’s fees in all cases involving the deprivation of civil rights. Adopted in response to this Court’s decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240 (1975), § 1988 was intended to close “anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws whereby awards of fees are . . . unavailable.” S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976). The Senate Report thus stated:
“In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
“ ‘Not to award counsel fees in cases such as this would be tantamount to repealing the Act itself by frustrating its basic purpose. . . . Without counsel fees the grant of Federal jurisdiction is but an empty gesture .. . .’ Hall *1030 v. Cole, 412 U. S. 1 (1973), quoting 462 F. 2d 777, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972).
“The remedy of attorneys’ fees has always been recognized as particularly appropriate in the civil rights area, and civil rights and attorneys’ fees have always been closely interwoven.” Id., at 2-3.
It would be anomalous, to say the least, for Congress to have passed a provision as broad as §1988, and to provide an equally broad explanation, and yet to leave a “gap” in its own coverage of the constitutional claims of handicapped children seeking a free appropriate public education. 7 See also H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, pp. 4-5 (1976).
In sum, the Court’s conclusion that the EHA repealed the availability of §§504 and 1983 to individuals seeking a free appropriate public education runs counter to well-established principles of statutory interpretation. It finds no support in the terms or legislative history of the EHA. And, most importantly, it undermines the intent of Congress in enacting both §§ 505(b) and 1988. Had this case arisen prior to the enactment of §§ 505(b) and 1988, Congress could have taken account of the Court’s expansive interpretation of the EHA. Presumably, it would have either clarified the applicability of §§ 504 and 1983 to claims for a free appropriate public education, or it would have extended the coverage of §§ 505(b) and 1988 to certain claims brought under the EHA. But with today’s decision coming as it does after Congress has *1031 spoken on the subject of attorney’s fees, Congress will now have to take the time to revisit the matter. And until it does, the handicapped children of this country whose difficulties are compounded by discrimination and by other deprivations of constitutional rights will have to pay the costs. It is at best ironic that the Court has managed to impose this burden on handicapped children in the course of interpreting a statute wholly intended to promote the educational rights of those children.
The Court holds that petitioners may not recover any fees for this lawsuit. That result is wrong, I believe, without regard to whether § 505(b) requires an unlitigated § 504 claim to be meritorious or merely “substantial.” Even if petitioners must establish the meritoriousness, and not just the substantiality, of their unlitigated § 504 claim, affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment would be improper, for petitioners have been given no opportunity to establish that their § 504 claim has merit and because petitioners are entitled to fees under § 1988. Since I think petitioners are entitled to fees under § 1988, and since even my dissent from the Court’s holding on § 505(b) does not depend on whether the substantiality standard applies to unlitigated § 504 claims, I do not address that question.
1 also need not consider what effect petitioners’ due process claim against respondents, ante, at 1013-1016, may have on petitioners’ entitlement to fees. I dissent from the Court’s holding because I believe that petitioners are entitled to fees under § 1988 and may be entitled to fees under § 505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act. Petitioners’ due process claim might have a bearing on the amount of fees they should recover, but it does not deprive petitioners of all entitlement to a fee award.
Some claims covered by the EHA are also grounded in the Constitution and hence could be pursued under § 1983. Others are nonconstitutional claims cognizable under § 504. Still others are noneonstitutional claims cognizable only under the EHA. This case is concerned only with claims that have as a substantive basis both the EHA and either the Constitution or §504.
The Court at one point seems to indicate that Congress actually considered the question of withholding attorney’s fees from prevailing parties in actions covered by the EHA. Ante, at 1020-1021. But at the time the EHA was enacted, neither § 505(b) of the-Rehabilitation Act nor § 1988 had yet been enacted. In that context, congressional silence on the question of attorney’s fees can only be interpreted to indicate that Congress did not consider the matter. Thus, this claim is particularly unpersuasive and, in fact, does not appear to constitute a significant basis of the Court’s decision.
As the Court notes, ante, at 1017, n. 20, the regulations promulgated under § 504 and the EHA were closely coordinated with one another. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22677 (1977).
In addition, testimony was generally taken on the success of § 504 as applied to discrimination against handicapped children in the provision of publicly funded education. See, e. g., Hearings on Implementation of Section 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 263-265 (1977) (statement of Daniel Yohalem, Children’s Defense Fund); id., at 278-285 (statement of Edward E. Corbett, Jr., Maryland School for the Deaf).
Mr. Tatel’s testimony included the following:
“With regard to preschool, elementary, and secondary education institutions, the regulations require:
“ — annual identification and location of unserved hadicapped children;
“ — free appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped child regardless of the nature or severity of the handicap (including coverage of nonmedical care, room and board where residential placement required);
“ — education of handicapped students to maximum extent possible;
“ — comparability of facilities (including services and activities provided therein) identifiable as being for handicapped persons;
“ — evaluation requirements to insure proper classification and placement of handicapped children and procedural safeguards;
“ — equal opportunity for participation of handicapped students in nonacademic and extracurricular services and activities.” Id., at 296.
Moreover, Congress was fully aware of the possibility that the same claim in the civil rights area might have duplicative statutory remedies. For instance, one of the “gaps” that Congress sought to close in enacting § 1988 was the possibility that an individual could bring an employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and receive attorney’s fees, although another individual bringing the same suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 could not recover attorney’s fees. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976). Congress’ response to this situation was to ensure that attorney’s fees would be available under either provision.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429771. Public record. Not legal advice.