# Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart > Supreme Court of the United States · May 21, 1984 · 467 U.S. 20 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429616 ## Case - **Full name:** SEATTLE TIMES CO., Dba THE SEATTLE TIMES, Et Al. v. RHINEHART Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 21, 1984 - **Citations:** 467 U.S. 20; 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1705; 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1606; 52 U.S.L.W. 4612; 104 S. Ct. 2199; 81 L. Ed. 2d 17; 1984 U.S. LEXIS 85 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brennan - **Judges:** Powell, Brennan, Marshall - **Cited by:** 1,736 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429616 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that “restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information,” and that “where a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c) [of the Federal Rules of … - holding that there is no First Amendment Right to publicize information obtained in discovery. “We therefore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discov… - stating that “[a]s in this case, such a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only that information obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the informatio… - explaining that the liberality of the discovery process creates “a significant potential for abuse” such as delay, expense, misuse of process, and damage to the reputation and privacy of litigants and third parties, and courts “clearly ha[ve] a substantial interest in preventi… - holding that a Rule 26(c) protective order based on good cause, restricting only information obtained through discovery and allowing free use of the same information if acquired independently, does not violate the First Amendment because courts may regulate discovery to preven… ## Opinion text Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring. The Court today recognizes that pretrial protective orders, designed to limit the dissemination of information gained through the civil discovery process, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. As the Court acknowledges, before approving such protective orders, “it is necessary to consider whether the ‘practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression’ and whether ‘the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental *38 interest involved.’ ” Ante, at 32 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974)). In this case, the respondents opposed discovery, and in the alternative sought a protective order for discovered materials, because the “compelled production of the identities of the Foundation’s donors and members would violate the First Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association.” Ante, at 25. The Supreme Court of Washington found that these interests constituted the requisite “good cause” under the State’s Rule 26(c) (upon “good cause shown,” the court may make “any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”). 98 Wash. 2d 226, 256 , 654 P. 2d 673, 690 (1982). Given this finding, the court approved a protective order limited to “information . . . regarding the financial affairs of the various [respondents], the names and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, or donors to any of the various [respondents].” Ante, at 27, n. 8. I agree that the respondents’ interests in privacy and religious freedom are sufficient to justify this protective order and to overcome the protections afforded free expression by the First Amendment. I therefore join the Court’s opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429616. Public record. Not legal advice.