# Jones v. Barnes > Supreme Court of the United States · July 5, 1983 · 463 U.S. 745 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429342 ## Case - **Full name:** JONES, SUPERINTENDENT, GREAT MEADOW CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Et Al. v. BARNES - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** July 5, 1983 - **Citations:** 463 U.S. 745; 51 U.S.L.W. 5151; 103 S. Ct. 3308; 77 L. Ed. 2d 987; 1983 U.S. LEXIS 105 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Blackmun - **Judges:** Burger, Blackmun, Brennan - **Cited by:** 6,945 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429342 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that 26 appellate counsel is not under “a duty to raise every ‘colorable’ claim suggested by a 27 2 Notably, Hardy did not raise a claim in his habeas petition alleging that appellate counsel 28 performed ineffectively with respect to this issue, nor did he raise such … - explaining that an indigent appellant does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press every nonfrivolous point on appeal and recognizing “the importance of having the appellate advocate examine the record with a view to selecting the most promising is… - recognizing that a defendant has “the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, ... take an appeal, [and] with some limitations, ... act as his or her own advocate” - recognizing that, where ethically and legally possible, “ ‘ lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation’ ” - holding that “[a]pellate counsel has no duty to assert every potentially colorable claim of error, even if his client urges him to do so” ## Opinion text Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment. I do not join the Court’s opinion, because I need not decide in this case, ante, at 751, whether there is or is not a constitutional right to a first appeal of a criminal conviction, and because I agree with Justice Brennan, and the American Bar Association, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 21-3.2, Comment, p. 21-42 (2d ed. 1980), that, as an ethical matter, an attorney should argue on appeal all nonfrivolous claims upon which his client insists. Whether or not one agrees with the Court’s view of legal strategy, it seems to me that the lawyer, after giving his client his best opinion as to the course most likely to succeed, should acquiesce in the client’s choice of which nonfrivolous claims to pursue. Certainly, Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967), and Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), indicate that the attorney’s usurpation of certain fundamental decisions can *755 violate the Constitution. I agree with the Court, however, that neither my view, nor the ABA’s view, of the ideal allocation of decisionmaking authority between client and lawyer necessarily assumes constitutional status where counsel’s performance is “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970), and “assure[s] the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State’s appellate process,” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 616 (1974). I agree that both these requirements were met here. But the attorney, by refusing to carry out his client’s express wishes, cannot forever foreclose review of nonfrivolous constitutional claims. As I noted in Faretta v. California, 422 U. S., at 848 (dissenting opinion), “[f]or such overbearing conduct by counsel, there is a remedy,” citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1 (1966), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 439 (1963). The remedy, of course, is a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, while the Court does not reach the question, ante, at 754, n. 7, I state my view that counsel’s failure to raise on appeal nonfrivolous constitutional claims upon which his client has insisted must constitute “cause and prejudice” for any resulting procedural default under state law. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429342. Public record. Not legal advice.