# Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington > Supreme Court of the United States · May 23, 1983 · 461 U.S. 540 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429198 ## Case - **Full name:** REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, Et Al. v. TAXATION WITH REPRESENTATION OF WASHINGTON - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 23, 1983 - **Citations:** 461 U.S. 540; 51 U.S.L.W. 4583; 51 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1294; 103 S. Ct. 1997; 76 L. Ed. 2d 129; 1983 U.S. LEXIS 33 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Blackmun - **Judges:** Blackmun, Rehnquist, Black-Mun, Brennan, Marshall - **Cited by:** 733 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429198 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the Internal Revenue Code's prohibition on granting 501(c)(3) status to organizations engaged in substantial lobbying activities was constitutional given that these organization could claim tax exemptions for their non-lobbying activities, and thus the prohibition… - holding that statute that conditioned a government benefit, i.e., a tax exemption, on the recipient giving up its right to engage in political speech did not violate the constitutional conditions because the statute was not intended to suppress any ideas and the plaintiff rema… - explaining that heightened scrutiny is not required of all conditions on government funding or tax exemptions that merely “ ‘affect [ ] First Amendment rights’ ” (quoting Taxation With Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 728 (D.C.Cir.1982)) (emphasis added in Supreme Court … - stating in dicta that "the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right" in the context of a claim that the Internal Revenue Code's failure to exempt attempts to influence legislation violated the First Amendment - recognizing that “a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right” ## Opinion text Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, concurring. I join the Court’s opinion. Because 26 U. S. C. § 501’s discrimination between veterans’ organizations and charitable organizations is not based on the content of their speech, ante, at 548, I agree with the Court that § 501 does not deny charitable organizations equal protection of the law. The benefit provided to veterans’ organizations is rationally based on the Nation’s time-honored policy of “compensating veterans for their past contributions.” Ante, this page. As the Court says, ante, at 548 and 550, a statute designed to discourage the expression of particular views would present a very different question. I also agree that the First Amendment does not require the Government to subsidize protected activity, ante, at 546, *552 and that this principle controls disposition of TWR’s First Amendment claim. I write separately to make clear that in my view the result under the First Amendment depends entirely upon the Court’s necessary assumption — which I share — about the manner in which the Internal Revenue Service administers § 501. If viewed in isolation, the lobbying restriction contained in § 501(c)(3) violates the principle, reaffirmed today, ante, at 545, “that the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.” Section 501(c)(3) does not merely deny a subsidy for lobbying activities, see Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498 (1959); it deprives an otherwise eligible organization of its tax-exempt status and its eligibility to receive tax-deductible contributions for all its activities, whenever one of those activities is “substantial lobbying.” Because lobbying is protected by the First Amendment, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127, 137-138 (1961), § 501(c)(3) therefore denies a significant benefit to organizations choosing to exercise their constitutional rights. * The constitutional defect that would inhere in § 501(c)(3) alone is avoided by § 501(c)(4). As the Court notes, ante, at 544, TWR may use its present § 501(c)(3) organization for its nonlobbying activities and may create a § 501(c)(4) affiliate to pursue its charitable goals through lobbying. *553 The § 501(c)(4) affiliate would not be eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions. Given this relationship between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4), the Court finds that Congress’ purpose in imposing the lobbying restriction was merely to ensure that “no tax-deductible contributions are used to pay for substantial lobbying.” Ante, at 544, n. 6; see ante, at 545. Consistent with that purpose, “[t]he IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay for lobbying.” Ante, at 545, n. 6. As long as the IRS goes no further than this, we perhaps can safely say that “[t]he Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible contributions to support its nonlobbying activity, nor does it deny TWR any independent benefit on account of its intention to lobby.” Ante, at 545. A § 501(c)(3) organization’s right to speak is not infringed, because it is free to make known its views on legislation through its § 501(c)(4) affiliate without losing tax benefits for its nonlobbying activities. Any significant restriction on this channel of communication, however, would negate the saving effect of § 501(c)(4). It must be remembered that § 501(c)(3) organizations retain their constitutional right to speak and to petition the Government. Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these organizations exercise over the lobbying of their § 501(c)(4) affiliates, the First Amendment problems would be insurmountable. It hardly answers one person’s objection to a restriction on his speech that another person, outside his control, may speak for him. Similarly, an attempt to prevent § 501(c)(4) organizations from lobbying explicitly on behalf of their § 501(c)(3) affiliates would perpetuate § 501(c)(3) organizations’ inability to make known their views on legislation without incurring the unconstitutional penalty. Such restrictions would extend far beyond Congress’ mere refusal to subsidize lobbying. See ante, at 544-545, n. 6. In my view, *554 any such restriction would render the statutory scheme unconstitutional. I must assume that the IRS will continue to administer §§ 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) in keeping with Congress’ limited purpose and with the IRS’s duty to respect and uphold the Constitution. I therefore agree with the Court that the First Amendment questions in these cases are controlled by Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498, 513 (1959), rather than by Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 518-519 (1958), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972). See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 518-519 (1958); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (denial of business-expense deduction for lobbying is constitutional, but an attempt to deny all deductions for business expenses to a taxpayer who lobbies would penalize unconstitutionally the exercise of First Amendment rights); cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 317, n. 19 (1980) (denial of welfare benefits for abortion is constitutional, but an attempt to withhold all welfare benefits from one who exercises right to an abortion probably would be impermissible); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 474-475, n. 8 (1977) (same). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9429198. Public record. Not legal advice.