# New York v. Ferber > Supreme Court of the United States · July 2, 1982 · 458 U.S. 747 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428937 ## Case - **Full name:** New York v. Ferber - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** July 2, 1982 - **Citations:** 458 U.S. 747; 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1809; 50 U.S.L.W. 5077; 102 S. Ct. 3348; 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113; 1982 U.S. LEXIS 12 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by O'Connor - **Judges:** White, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens - **Cited by:** 2,136 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428937 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that “the [s]tates are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children[,]” that “[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance[,]” and that “[i]t is evident … - stating that child pornography may be regulated as an integral part of the abuse that produced that pornography, and quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684, 688, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949): "`It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional f… - stating that child pornography maybe regulated as an integral part of the abuse that produced that pornography, and quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 US 490, 498, 69 S Ct 684, 93 L Ed 834 (1949): “ ‘It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom fo… - holding that sexually explicit material involving children generally is not protected by the First Amendment of the federal constitution and, therefore, the distribution, possession, and manufacture of such material constitutionally may be criminalized even if the material is … - holding that a state interest in preventing the sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a “compelling” state interest that justifies the limited curtailment of First Amendment rights because, inter alia, the “distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual… ## Opinion text Justice O’Connor, concurring. Although I join the Court’s opinion, I write separately to stress that the Court does not hold that New York must except “material with serious literary, scientific, or educational value,” ante, at 766, from its statute. The Court merely holds that, even if the First Amendment shelters such material, New York’s current statute is not sufficiently overbroad to support respondent’s facial attack. The compelling interests identified in today’s opinion, see ante, at 756-764, suggest that the Constitution might in fact permit New York to ban knowing distribution of works depicting minors engaged in explicit sexual conduct, regardless of the social value of the depictions. For example, a 12-year-old child photographed while *775 masturbating surely suffers the same psychological harm whether the community labels the photograph “edifying” or “tasteless.” The audience’s appreciation of the depiction is simply irrelevant to New York’s asserted interest in protecting children from psychological, emotional, and mental harm. An exception for depictions of serious social value, moreover, would actually increase opportunities for the content-based censorship disfavored by the First Amendment. As drafted, New York’s statute does not attempt to suppress the communication of particular ideas. The statute permits discussion of child sexuality, forbidding only attempts to render the “portrayal[s] somewhat more ‘realistic’ by utilizing or photographing children.” Ante, at 763. Thus, the statute attempts to protect minors from abuse without attempting to restrict the expression of ideas by those who might use children as live models. On the other hand, it is quite possible that New York’s statute is overbroad because it bans depictions that do not actually threaten the harms identified by the Court. For example, clinical pictures of adolescent sexuality, such as those that might appear in medical textbooks, might not involve the type of sexual exploitation and abuse targeted by New York’s statute. Nor might such depictions feed the poisonous “kiddie porn” market that New York and other States have attempted to regulate. Similarly, pictures of children engaged in rites widely approved by their cultures, such as those that might appear in issues of the National Geographic, might not trigger the compelling interests identified by the Court. It is not necessary to address these possibilities further today, however, because this potential overbreadth is not sufficiently substantial to warrant facial invalidation of New York’s statute. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428937. Public record. Not legal advice.