# United States v. Frady

> Supreme Court of the United States · May 24, 1982 · 456 U.S. 152

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428738

## Case

- **Full name:** United States v. Frady
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** May 24, 1982
- **Citations:** 456 U.S. 152; 102 S. Ct. 1584; 71 L. Ed. 2d 816; 1982 U.S. LEXIS 95
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stevens
- **Judges:** O'Connor, White, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Blackmun, Brennan, Burger, Marshall
- **Cited by:** 5,524 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Charles N. Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899 (1982).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 4
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428738

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that procedural default rules developed in the habeas corpus context apply in §2255 eases
- concluding that Rule 52(b)’s plain error standard “was intended for use on direct appeal” and “is out of place when a prisoner launches a collateral attack against a criminal conviction after society's legitimate interest in the finality of the judgment has been perfected by t…
- holding in a murder case that "the strong uncontradicted evidence of malice in the record, coupled with [the defendant’s] utter failure to come forward with a colorable claim that he acted without malice, disposes of his contention that he suffered ... actual prejudice” from a…
- holding that this is a “significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal” and requires “not merely that the errors at [Petitioner’s] trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage” such that they “overcome…
- holding that, to demonstrate prejudice, a habeas petitioner must show that “the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process, not merely whether the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally conde…

## Opinion text

Justice Stevens,
concurring.
Although my view of the relevance of the cause for counsel’s failure to object to a jury instruction is significantly different from the Court’s, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 94-97 (Stevens, J., concurring); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 538 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Engle v. Isaac, ante, at 136-137, n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I have joined the Court’s opinion in this case because it properly focuses on the character of the prejudice to determine whether collateral relief is appropriate.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428738. Public record. Not legal advice.