# Polk County v. Dodson > Supreme Court of the United States · December 14, 1981 · 454 U.S. 312 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428552 ## Case - **Full name:** POLK COUNTY Et Al. v. DODSON - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** December 14, 1981 - **Citations:** 454 U.S. 312; 102 S. Ct. 445; 70 L. Ed. 2d 509; 1981 U.S. LEXIS 136 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Burger - **Judges:** Powell, Burger, Brennan, White, Marshall, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Con-Nor, Blackmun - **Cited by:** 4,966 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428552 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that a defense lawyer paid by the state is not a state actor because the relationship between the lawyer and client is “identical to that existing between any other lawyer and client, except for the source of … payment. The legal system posits that a … lawyer best serv… - holding that, while public defender does not act under color of state law when performing traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding, public defender may act under color of state law when performing other functions on behalf of the state such as h… - holding that public defender is not a "state actor," reasoning that public defender's role is traditionally filled by retained counsel, for which state office and authority are not needed, and rejecting argument that "employment relationship" alone establishes state-actor elem… - holding that a public defender does not act “under color of state law” because he “works under canons of professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent judgment on behalf of the client” and because there is an “assumption that counsel will be free of stat… - finding, where the plaintiff alleged that an Offender Advocate assigned an ineffective appellate counsel and established the rules and procedures for counsel, that plaintiff failed to present a claim because he relied on “a respondeat superior theory of liability.” ## Opinion text Chief Justice Burger, concurring. I join the Court’s opinion, but it is important to emphasize that in providing counsel for an accused the governmental participation is very limited. Under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), the government undertakes only to provide a professionally qualified advocate wholly independent of the government. It is the independence from governmental control as to how the assigned task is to be performed that is crucial. The advocate, as an officer of the court which issued the commission to practice, owes an obligation to the court to repudiate any external effort to direct how the obligations to the client are to be carried out. The obligations owed by the attorney to the client are defined by the professional codes, not by the governmental entity from which the defense advocate’s compensation is derived. Disciplinary Rule 5-107 (B) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility * succinctly states the rule: *328 “(B) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal services.” Moreover, it is elementary that every advocate has an obligation to eschew proceedings considered to be professionally improper or irresponsible. Once counsel in this case reached a considered judgment on the merits of the claim sought to be put forward, her actions were consistent with the highest traditions of the Bar. See, e. g., ABA Code Of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5 (1976): “A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client.” Ethical Consideration 5-1 explains this Canon: “The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.” See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, Ch. 3, The Defense Function, Ch. 4 (2d ed. 1980). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428552. Public record. Not legal advice.