# Edwards v. Arizona > Supreme Court of the United States · June 22, 1981 · 451 U.S. 477 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428325 ## Case - **Full name:** Edwards v. Arizona - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 22, 1981 - **Citations:** 451 U.S. 477; 101 S. Ct. 1880; 68 L. Ed. 2d 378; 1981 U.S. LEXIS 96 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Burger - **Judges:** White, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist - **Cited by:** 5,939 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Declined to follow by State v. Trochez-Jimenez, 180 Wash. 2d 445 (2014). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 36 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428325 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding "that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of h… - holding that Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right; absent counsel, further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent convers… - holding that, once the accused asserts this Fifth Amendment right to counsel and thereby “expresse[s] his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless t… - holding that under the Fifth Amendment, once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire “to deal with the police only through counsel, [that person] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available ... unless th… - holding, inter alia, that during a custodial interrogation, where accused has expressed the desire to deal with the police only through counsel, the accused “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the acc… ## Opinion text Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment. I concur only in the judgment because I do not agree that either any constitutional standard or the holding of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) — as distinguished from its dicta — calls for a special rule as to how an accused in custody may waive the right to be free from interrogation. The extraordinary protections afforded a person in custody suspected of criminal conduct are not without a valid basis, but *488 as with all “good” things they can be carried too far. The notion that any “prompting” of a person in custody is somehow evil per se has been rejected. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980). For me, the inquiry in this setting is whether resumption of interrogation is a result of a, voluntary waiver, and that inquiry should be resolved under the traditional standards established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938): “A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver . . . must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Accord, e. g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369 (1979). In this case, the Supreme Court of Arizona described the situation as follows: “When the detention officer told Edwards that the detectives were there to see him, he told the officer that he did not wish to speak to anyone. The officer told him that he had to.” 122 Ariz. 206, 209 , 594 P. 2d 72, 75 (1979) (emphasis added). This is enough for me, and on this record the Supreme Court of Arizona erred in holding that the resumption of interrogation was the product of a voluntary waiver, such as I found to be the situation in both Innis, supra, at 304 (concurring opinion), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 417-418 (1977) (dissenting opinion). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428325. Public record. Not legal advice.