# University of Texas v. Camenisch > Supreme Court of the United States · April 29, 1981 · 451 U.S. 390 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428316 ## Case - **Full name:** UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS Et Al. v. CAMENISCH - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** April 29, 1981 - **Citations:** 451 U.S. 390; 49 U.S.L.W. 4468; 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,725; 101 S. Ct. 1830; 68 L. Ed. 2d 175; 1981 U.S. LEXIS 91 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Burger - **Judges:** Stewart, Burger - **Cited by:** 2,334 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned by West Virginia Association of Community Health Centers, Inc. v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary, Health & Human Services, 734 F.2d 1570 (1984). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428316 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that when a district court grants a preliminary injunction, the parties generally have not had the opportunity to present their cases nor receive a final decision on the merits. "Thus when the injunctive aspects of a case become moot on appeal of a preliminary injun… - reasoning that "a federal district court [should] consider four factors when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction: whether the plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if the injunction does not issue; whether the defendant will be harmed if the injunction does issue… - holding appeal from order granting preliminary injunction was moot because “the terms of the injunction ... ha[d] been fully and irrevocably carried out” by the time we issued our opinion, and that, because the only issue remaining must be resolved after a full trial, it was “… - stating that it is generally inappropriate to render a final judgment on the merits at the preliminary injunction stage because "a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial o… - holding that findings at preliminary injunction stage were not binding on 12 district court at the summary judgment stage ## Opinion text Chief Justice Burger, concurring. I join the Court’s opinion, but I consider it important to emphasize several aspects of the case, especially as to the regulations. It is undisputed that the University stood willing to permit respondent to have a sign-language interpreter present in the classroom at respondent’s expense, and in fact had allowed that for some time prior to the filing of this lawsuit. It is also undisputed that the University’s refusal to pay for an *399 interpreter was based solely on the fact that respondent did not meet the University’s established income criteria for financial assistance to graduate students. * The Court’s opinion, of course, is not to be read as intimating that respondent has any likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. The Court holds no more than that, since there has been no trial, respondent has a right to present evidence in support of his claim. The trial court must, among other things, decide whether the federal regulations at issue, which go beyond the carefully worded nondiscrimination provision of § 504, exceed the powers of the Secretary under § 504. The Secretary has no authority to rewrite the statutory scheme by means of regulations. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 410 (1979); see also Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, ante, at 17 (“[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously”). Respondent and his wife, who have no children, had a combined gross income in excess of $23,000 per year while he was enrolled as a student. Stipulation of Facts, App. 31. At oral argument, respondent asserted that even a $100,000 annual income would not affect his right to an interpreter at public expense. The University advised respondent that its policy was to pay for interpreter services when the services were not available from other agencies such as the Texas Rehabilitation Commission and the Texas Commission for the Deaf, provided that “such assistance will be based on a reasonable interpretation of financial need on an individual basis, using guidelines already in effect for Federal and other financial assistance.” According to those guidelines, respondent had zero financial need. Id., at 33. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428316. Public record. Not legal advice.