# Hughes v. Rowe > Supreme Court of the United States · November 10, 1980 · 449 U.S. 5 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428093 ## Case - **Full name:** HUGHES v. ROWE Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** November 10, 1980 - **Citations:** 449 U.S. 5; 49 U.S.L.W. 3346; 101 S. Ct. 173; 66 L. Ed. 2d 163; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by White - **Judges:** White, Rehnquist, Stewakt, Court'S - **Cited by:** 3,643 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428093 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that pleadings drafted by pro se litigants should be held to a lesser standard than those drafted by lawyers since “[a]n unrepresented litigant should not be punished for his failure to recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims” - explaining that “a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” - holding that in order to avoid inequity, courts must construe pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally - holding that a pro se prisoner complaint “should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief’ - explaining that a pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief” ## Opinion text Justice White, concurring in part and concurring in the result. I agree with the result reached in Part II of the per curiam opinion. Under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), a prior hearing was required for the particular disciplinary action involved here — segregation and loss of good time. But as Wolff makes clear, Fourteenth Amendment procedural protections were triggered only because under state law — here prison regulations — segregation and good-time reductions could be imposed only for serious disciplinary lapses and only after a prior hearing. 1 Under these regulations, segregation *17 prior to a hearing could occur only for reasons of prison security and safety. 2 I agree that there have been no findings that warranted dispensing with the prior hearing. It is well to point out, however, that although petitioner sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief, he had a full hearing within 48 hours of his confinement, his guilt was properly established (indeed, he admitted his conduct as he had before), and the discipline imposed on him was found to be justified. Even if petitioner is successful in proving a due process deprivation, his damages would be limited to those flowing from postponement of a hearing for two days. Under Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978), it is likely that only nominal damages would be awardable. I am in accord with Part III of the Court’s opinion. Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Regulations in effect at the time of this incident provided that a Program Team could act on charges of minor rule violations, but that an Adjustment Committee hearing was required on all other charges of rule violations, “including those which may result in programmatic removal from the population, demotion in grade, or loss of good time.” Administrative Regulation § 804 (II) (A) (4). The regulations also provided that a resident must be in *17 formed, inter alia, that “if found guilty of a serious rule violation [by the Adjustment Committee] and found to be a danger to the institutional community, he may be placed in segregation and/or deprived of his current grade and statutory good time credit.” § 804 (II) (B) (4). Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Regulations authorized confinement of a resident in a holding unit pending the completion of an investigation “in the interest of institutional security and safety.” See § 804 (II) (G) (1), quoted in full in the majority opinion, ante, at 12, n. 11. The regulations also authorized confinement of a resident in a holding unit in two other situations, again for security reasons. Section 804 (II) (E) (1) provided: “Whenever it is necessary to remove a resident from the general population on an emergency basis due to serious aggressive behavior and/or for safekeeping, the shift captain and/or unit manager must authorize the placement of a resident in a holding unit until the next meeting of the Adjustment Committee, which in no case may exceed 72 hours.” Section 804 (II) (F) (1) provided: “Whenever it is deemed necessary by the Chief Administrative Officer to *18 transfer a resident to another correctional facility for security reasons, the resident may be confined in a holding unit for not more than 72 hours. See ARs 819 and 822 on transfers.” --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428093. Public record. Not legal advice.