# United States v. Ward > Supreme Court of the United States · August 22, 1980 · 448 U.S. 242 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428053 ## Case - **Full name:** UNITED STATES v. WARD, Dba L. O. WARD OIL & GAS OPERATIONS - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** August 22, 1980 - **Citations:** 448 U.S. 242; 100 S. Ct. 2636; 65 L. Ed. 2d 742; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 53 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Blackmun - **Judges:** Blackmun, Rehnquist, Burger, Brennan, Stewart, White, Powell, Black-Mun, Marshall, Stevens - **Cited by:** 840 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428053 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the imposition of a fine for violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was a civil penalty even though the behavior to which the sanction applied was already a crime, noting that "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to t… - stating that “[initially, and importantly, Congress labeled the sanction authorized in [the statute] a ‘civil penalty,’ a label that takes on added significance given its juxtaposition with the criminal penalties set forth in the immediately preceding subparagraph” - concluding that the legislature’s intent was clear because the sanction was referred to as a “ ‘civil penalty,’ a label that takes on added significance given its juxtaposition with the criminal penalties set forth in the immediately preceding subparagraph” - explaining that a legislature “may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission” and that placing criminal and civil consequences in “two separate and distinct [statutory] provisions” was significant - explaining that the Supreme Court, in determining “whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal,” first looks to whether Congress “indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other” ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins, concurring in the judgment. I agree with the Court that a proceeding for assessment of a monetary penalty under § 311 (b)(6) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1321 (b)(6), is not a “criminal case” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. I reach this conclusion, however, for a number of reasons in addition to those discussed in the Court’s opinion. The Court of Appeals engaged in a careful analysis of the standards set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963), for distinguishing civil from criminal proceedings. These standards are cataloged in a footnote of the Court’s opinion. Ante, at 247-248, n. 7. The Court of Appeals concluded that some of the seven stated factors offered little guidance in this case, while others supported a “criminal” designation. In particular, it found that scienter played a part in determining the amount of penalty assessments; that the penalties promote traditional retributive aims of punishment; that behavior giving rise to the assessment is subject to criminal punishment under § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. § 407 ; and that the criteria employed by the Coast Guard to set the amount of assessments permit penalties that may be excessive in relation to alternative remedial or nonpunitive purposes. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F. 2d 1187, 1192-1194 (CA10 1979). The Court is content to discuss only one of *256 these findings. See ante, at 249-250. Because of the consideration given the others by the Court of Appeals, I think they deserve brief discussion, too. My analysis of these other factors differs from that of the Court of Appeals in two principal respects. First, I do not agree with that court’s apparent conclusion that none of the Mendoza-Martinez factors strongly supports a “civil” designation for a penalty proceeding under §311 (b)(6). I conclude that imposition of a monetary penalty under this statute does not result in the imposition of an “affirmative disability or restraint” within the meaning of Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S., at 168 ; that monetary assessments are traditionally a form of civil remedy; and that, as the Court of Appeals conceded, 598 F. 2d., at 1193, §311 (b)(6) serves remedial purposes dissociated from punishment. Although any one of these considerations by itself might not weigh heavily in favor of a “civil” designation, I think that cumulatively they point significantly in that direction. Second, I would assign less weight to the role of scienter, the promotion of penal objectives, and the potential exces-siveness of fines than did the Court of Appeals. Mendoza-Martinez suggested that a sanction that “comes into play only on a finding of scienter” might be indicative of a criminal proceeding. 372 U. S., at 168 (first emphasis added). Plainly, that is not the case here. Scienter is not mentioned on the face of the statute, and it is only one of many factors relevant to determination of an assessment under Coast Guard Commandant Instruction 5922.11B (Oct. 10, 1974). Furthermore, although the fines conceivably could be used to promote primarily deterrent or retributive ends, the fact that collected assessments are deposited in a revolving fund used to defray the expense of cleanup operations is a strong indicator of the pervasively civil and compensatory thrust of the statutory scheme. See §311 (k). 33 U. S. C. § 1321 (k). Finally, while some of the factors employed by the Coast Guard to set *257 the amount of assessments undoubtedly could be used to exact excessive penalties, others are expressly related to the cost of cleanup and other remedial considerations. In the absence, of evidence that excessive penalties actually have been assessed, I would be inclined to regard their likelihood as remote. For these reasons, I agree with the Court that only the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor, “whether the behavior to which [the sanction] applies is already a crime,” 372 TJ. S., at 168, supports the respondent. Since I feel that this factor alone does not mandate characterization of the proceeding as “criminal” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, particularly when other factors weigh in the opposite direction, I concur in the judgment. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9428053. Public record. Not legal advice.