# Carey v. Brown

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 20, 1980 · 447 U.S. 455

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427991

## Case

- **Full name:** CAREY, STATE’S ATTORNEY OF COOK COUNTY v. BROWN Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 20, 1980
- **Citations:** 447 U.S. 455; 100 S. Ct. 2286; 65 L. Ed. 2d 263; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 118
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stewart
- **Judges:** Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, Rehnquist, Burger, Blackmun
- **Cited by:** 828 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427991

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[w]hen government regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it…
- finding that the Constitution does not leave state officials "powerless to pass laws to protect the public from . . . conduct that disturbs the tranquility of spots selected by the people . . . [for] buildings that require peace and quiet to carry out their functions, such as …
- finding that the State’s compelling interest in preserving privacy by banning residential picketing did not justify a selective ban on nonlabor picketing since the interest was unrelated to the labor/nonlabor distinction
- holding that for a state to enforce a content based exclusion, it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling' state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that legitimate end
- stating that a law that only al lowed picketing on the subject of labor was subject matter discrimination

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring.
The opinion of the Court in this case, as did the Court’s opinion in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 , invokes the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis of decision. But what was actually at stake in Mosley , and is at stake here, is the basic meaning of the constitutional protection of free speech:
“[W]hile a municipality may constitutionally impose reasonable time, place, and manner regulations on the *472 use of its streets and sidewalks for First Amendment purposes, and may even forbid altogether such use of some of its facilities; what a municipality may not do under the First and Fourteenth Amendments is t-o discriminate in the regulation of expression on the basis of the content of that expression.” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 520 . (Citations omitted.)
It is upon this understanding that I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427991. Public record. Not legal advice.