# Rhode Island v. Innis > Supreme Court of the United States · May 12, 1980 · 446 U.S. 291 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427903 ## Case - **Full name:** Rhode Island v. Innis - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 12, 1980 - **Citations:** 446 U.S. 291; 100 S. Ct. 1682; 64 L. Ed. 2d 297; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 94 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Burger - **Judges:** Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Burger, Marshall, Brennan, Stevens - **Cited by:** 4,895 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Limited by People v. Villa-Gomez, 9 Cal. App. 5th 527 (2017). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 4 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427903 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that a police officer’s subjective intent to obtain incriminatory statements is not relevant to determining whether an interrogation has occurred - finding that brief conversation between patrolmen was not functional equivalent of questioning when there was nothing to suggest that'the police knew that the suspect was susceptible to the subject matter of their conversation, nothing suggested that the suspect was unusu *283… - holding that under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution “interrogation” “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know … - holding that officers’ conversation amongst themselves, with the suspect in the car, about concerns of disabled children finding the weapon used in the crime was not the functional equivalent of interrogation because there was no evidence the conversation was specifically desi… - holding that it was not interrogation when one officer said to another in the defendant's presence that a missing shotgun was near a school for handicapped children and expressed fear that one of the children might find the weapon and hurt themselves, in response to which the … ## Opinion text Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment. Since the result is not inconsistent with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), I concur in the judgment. The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Miranda , disparage it, nor extend it at this late date. I fear, however, that the rationale in Parts II-A and II-B of the Court’s opinion will not clarify the tension between this holding and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977), and our other cases. It may introduce new elements of uncertainty; under the Court’s test, a police officer, in the brief time available, apparently must evaluate the suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused. See, e. g., ante, at 302, n. 8. Few, if any, police officers are competent to make the kind of evaluation seemingly contemplated; even a psychiatrist asked to express an expert opinion on these aspects of a suspect in custody would very likely employ extensive questioning and observation to make the judgment now charged to police officers. *305 Trial judges have enough difficulty discerning the boundaries and nuances flowing from post-Miranda opinions, and we do not clarify that situation today. * That we may well be adding to the confusion is suggested by the problem dealt with in California v. Braeseke, 444 U. S. 1309 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (difficulty of determining whether a defendant has waived his Miranda rights), and cases cited therein. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427903. Public record. Not legal advice.