# Rush v. Savchuk > Supreme Court of the United States · January 21, 1980 · 444 U.S. 320 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427743 ## Case - **Full name:** RUSH Et Al. v. SAVCHUK - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** January 21, 1980 - **Citations:** 444 U.S. 320; 100 S. Ct. 571; 62 L. Ed. 2d 516; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 66 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens - **Judges:** Marshall, Burger, Stewart, White, Blacemun, Powell, Rehnquist, Brennan, Stevens - **Cited by:** 722 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427743 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that an approach which “shift[s] the focus of the inquiry from the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation to that among the plaintiff, the forum, [ ], and the litigation . . . is forbidden by International Shoe and its progeny” - holding that aggregating the defendant into a collective of “defending parties” did not satisfy federal due process - holding that party was not subject to state’s jurisdiction in a personal injury action simply because his insurer was based there, and stating that the requirement of minimum contacts “must be met as to each defendant ... ” - holding that the test for personal jurisdiction must be met “as to each defendant” - holding insurer’s place of business was not relevant in jurisdictional analysis involving car accident in other state because auto insurance policy was “not the subject matter of the case, [] nor [wa]s it related to the operative facts of the negligence action. The contractual… ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Stevens, dissenting. As the Court notes, appellant Rush had no contact with Minnesota that would support personal jurisdiction over him in that State. Ante, at 322. Moreover, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 , precludes the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction over his property in that forum if the intangible property attached is unrelated to the action. It does not follow, however, that the plaintiff may not obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over appellant’s insurance policy, since his carrier does business in Minnesota and since it has also specifically contracted in the policy attached to defend the very litigation that plaintiff has instituted in Minnesota. In this kind of case, the Minnesota statute authorizing jurisdiction is correctly characterized as the “functional equivalent” of a so-called direct-action statute. The impact of the judgment is against the insurer. * I believe such a direct-action statute is valid as applied to a suit brought by a forum resident, see Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66, 72 , even if the accident giving rise to the action did not occur in the forum State, see Minichiello v. Rosenberg, *334 410 F. 2d 106 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 844 , so long as it is understood that the forum may exercise no power whatsoever over the individual defendant. As so understood, it makes no difference whether the insurance company is sued in its own name or, as Minnesota law provides, in the guise of a suit against the individual defendant. In this case, although appellant Rush may have a contractual obligation to his insurer to appear in court to testify and generally to cooperate in the defense of the lawsuit, it is my understanding that Minnesota law does not compel him to do so through the contempt power or otherwise. Moreover, any judgment formally entered against the individual defendant may only be executed against the proceeds of his insurance policy. In my opinion, it would violate the Due Process Clause to make any use of such a judgment against that individual — for .example, by giving the judgment collateral-estoppel effect in a later action against him arising from the same accident. Accord, Minichiello v. Rosenberg, supra, at 112 ; Note, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth after Shaffer v. Heitner , 78 Colum. L. Rev. 409 , 418-419 (1978). But we are not now faced with any problem concerning use of a quasi in rem judgment against an individual defendant personally. I am therefore led to the conclusion that the Federal Constitution does not require the Minnesota courts to dismiss this action. It seems to me that the possible impact of a default judgment on the reputation of an individual, see ante, at 331, n. 20, who has no contacts whatever with the forum State is far too remote to affect the analysis of the constitutional issue in this case. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427743. Public record. Not legal advice.