# United States v. Kubrick > Supreme Court of the United States · November 28, 1979 · 444 U.S. 111 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427725 ## Case - **Full name:** United States v. Kubrick - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** November 28, 1979 - **Citations:** 444 U.S. 111; 100 S. Ct. 352; 62 L. Ed. 2d 259; 1979 U.S. LEXIS 152 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens - **Judges:** White, Burger, Stewart, Blachmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Brennan, Marshall - **Cited by:** 2,342 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427725 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that, in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the statute of limitations period accrues when a plaintiff discovers his injury and the cause, because a plaintiff “armed with the facts about the harm done to him, can protect himself by seeking advice in the ...… - holding under the Federal Tort Claims Act that plaintiff "armed with the facts about the harm done to him” is obligated to "protect himself by seeking advice in the medical and legal community, and to excuse him from promptly doing so by postponing the accrual of his claim wou… - concluding, discussing the application of a discovery rule to the statute of limitations under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that “[w]e are unconvinced that for statute of limitations purposes a plaintiff’s ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact of his inju… - holding that under the Federal Tort Claims Act “[a] plaintiff . . . armed with the facts about the harm done to him, can protect himself by seeking advice in the medical and legal community. To excuse him from promptly doing so by postponing the accrual of his claim would unde… ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Stevens, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Normally a tort claim accrues at the time of the plaintiff’s injury. In most cases that event provides adequate notice to the plaintiff of the possibility that his legal rights have been invaded. It is well settled, however, that the normal rule does *126 not apply to medical malpractice claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The reason for this exception is essentially the same as the reason for the general rule itself. The victim of medical malpractice frequently has no reason to believe that his legal rights have been invaded simply because some misfortune has followed medical treatment. Sometimes he may not even be aware of the actual injury until years have passed; at other times, he may recognize the harm but not know its cause; or, as in this case, he may have knowledge of the injury and its cause, but have no reason to suspect that a physician has been guilty of any malpractice. In such cases— until today — the rule that has been applied in the federal courts is that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until after fair notice of the invasion of the plaintiff’s legal rights. Essentially, there are two possible approaches to construction of the word “accrues” in statutes of limitations: (I) a claim might be deemed to “accrue” at the moment of injury without regard to the potentially harsh consequence of barring a meritorious claim before the plaintiff has a reasonable chance to assert his legal rights, or (2) it might “accrue” when a diligent plaintiff has knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on notice of an invasion of his legal rights. The benefits that flow from certainty in the administration of our affairs favor the former approach in most commercial situations. 1 But in medical malpractice cases the harsh consequences of that approach have generally been considered unacceptable/ 2 In all events, this Court adopted the latter approach over 30 years ago when it endorsed the principle that “blameless ignorance” should not cause the loss of a valid claim for *127 medical injuries. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Rutledge expressed the point simply: “We do not think the humane legislative plan [Federal Employers’ Liability Act] intended such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights.” Uñe v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 170 . This rule has been consistently applied by the Courts of Appeals in the intervening decades without any suggestion of complaint from Congress. In my judgment, a fair application of this rule forecloses the Court’s attempt to distinguish between a plaintiff’s knowledge of the cause of his injury on the one hand and his knowledge of the doctor’s failure to meet acceptable medical standards on the other. For in both situations the typical plaintiff will, and normally should, rely on his doctor’s explanation of the situation. 3 The Uñe rule would not, of course, prevent the statute from commencing to run if the plaintiff’s knowledge of an injury, or its cause, would place a reasonably diligent person on notice that a doctor had been guilty of misconduct. But if he neither suspects, nor has any reason to suspect, malpractice, I see no reason to treat his claim differently than if he were not aware of the cause of the harm or, indeed, of the harm itself. In this case the District Court expressly found that “plaintiff’s belief that there was no malpractice was reasonable in view of the technical complexity of the question *128 whether his neomycin treatment involved excessive risks, the failure of any of his doctors to suggest prior to June 1971 the possibility of negligence, and the repeated unequivocal assertions by the Veterans Administration that there was no negligence on the part of the government.” 435 F. Supp. 166, 174 . The Court is certainly correct in stating that one purpose of the statute of limitations is to require the “reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims against the Government.” Ante, at 123. A plaintiff who remains ignorant through lack of diligence cannot be characterized as “blameless.” But unless the Court is prepared to reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment that the District Court’s findings were adequately supported by the evidence, the principle of requiring diligence does not justify the result the Court reaches today. The District Court found that “plaintiff exercised all kinds of reasonable diligence in attempting to establish a medical basis for increased disability benefits.” 435 F. Supp., at 185 . That diligence produced not only the Government’s denials, but, worse, what may have been a fabrication. It was only after the Government told plaintiff that Dr. Soma had suggested that plaintiff’s occupation as a machinist had caused his deafness that plaintiff, by confronting Dr. Soma, first became aware that neomycin irrigation may not have been an acceptable medical practice. Plaintiff was unquestionably diligent; moreover, his diligence ultimately bore fruit. There is no basis for assuming, as this Court holds, that plaintiff could have been more diligent and discovered his cause of action sooner. The issue of diligence in a negligence case should be resolved by the factfinder — not by the Supreme Court of the United States — and its resolution should depend on the evidence in the record, rather than on speculation about what might constitute diligence in various other circumstances. 4 *129 Since a large number of circuit judges have reached the same conclusion, and since I find nothing in the Court’s opinion that lessens my respect for their collective wisdom, I would simply affirm the unanimous holding of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirming the judgment of the District Court which merely applied well-settled law to the somewhat unusual facts of this case. 5 See Gates Rubber Co. v, USM Corp., 508 F. 2d 603, 611 (CA7 1975). One should note not only the cases cited by the Court in its footnote 7, ante, at 120, but also the reference to “a wave of recent decisions” in the quotation from the Restatement (Second) of Torts in that footnote. In its discussion of the reasons why most jurisdictions have adopted a special rule for medical malpractice cases, the Restatement (Second) of Torts notes “that the nature of the tort itself and the character of the injury will frequently prevent knowledge of what is wrong, so that the plaintiff is forced to rely upon what he is told by the physician or surgeon.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, Comment e, p. 444 (1979). The factual predicate for the Court’s speculation is its assumption that if a patient who has been mistreated by one doctor should ask *129 another if the first “failed to live up to minimum standards of medical proficiency, the odds are that a competent doctor will so inform the plaintiff.” Ante, at 122. I am not at all sure about those odds. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts 164 (4th ed. 1971); Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 520 (1965); Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 Cath. U. L. Rev. 158 (1966). But whatever the odds are generally, I would prefer to have the issue of the diligence in exploring the reason for the unfortunate condition of this deaf plaintiff decided on the basis of evidence relevant to his particular injury. Not only do I dissent from the Court's result, but I also believe the decision to grant certiorari was ill-advised. The Court notes, ante, at 125, that Congress may change the rule announced today. I would add that Congress possesses certain options we do not have, such as creating a bifurcated statute, to temper the interest in repose when it threatens to cause an unfair result. See Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F. 2d, at 611-612 . But Congress possessed the same options before this decision as well as after it. There was nothing to prevent the Executive from notifying Congress that the omission of any statutory definition of the word “accrues” has created problems that need legislative attention. Reversal of a just judgment is an unnecessarily high price to pay in order to provide Congress with that notice. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427725. Public record. Not legal advice.