# Scott v. Illinois

> Supreme Court of the United States · March 5, 1979 · 440 U.S. 367

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427480

## Case

- **Full name:** Scott v. Illinois
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** March 5, 1979
- **Citations:** 440 U.S. 367; 99 S. Ct. 1158; 59 L. Ed. 2d 383; 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Powell
- **Judges:** Blackmun, Rehnquist, Burger, Stewart, White, Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blacicmun
- **Cited by:** 848 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled by Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427480

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense” (emphasis …
- holding that a misdemeanor conviction for shoplifting where a defendant was not provided counsel did not violate the Sixth Amendment because his sentence consisted of a fine only, even though the statute authorized up to a year of jail time
- recognizing that, under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel andFourteenth Amendment Due Process guarantees, a defendant must be afforded the benefits of counsel in cases where the defendant receives jail time
- holding that the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases only applies where the defendant is actually sentenced to imprisonment and not merely where imprisonment is an authorized punishment

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring.
For the reasons stated in my opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 44 (1972), I do not think the rule adopted by the Court in that case is required by the Constitution. Moreover, the drawing of a line based on whether there is imprisonment (even for overnight) can have the practical effect of precluding provision of counsel in other types of cases in which conviction can have more serious consequences. The Argersinger rule also tends to impair the proper functioning of the criminal justice system in that trial judges, in advance of hearing any evidence and before knowing anything about the case except the charge, all too often will be compelled to forgo the legislatively granted option to impose a sentence of imprisonment upon conviction. Preserving this option by providing counsel often will be impossible or impracticable — particularly in congested urban courts where scores of cases are heard in a single sitting, and in small and rural communities where lawyers may not be available.
Despite my continuing reservations about the Argersinger rule, it was approved by the Court in the 1972 opinion and four Justices have reaffirmed it today. It is important that this Court provide clear guidance to the hundreds of courts across the country that confront this problem daily. Accordingly, and mindful of stare decisis, I join the opinion of the *375 Court. I do so, however, with the hope that in due time a majority will recognize that a more flexible rule is consistent with due process and will better serve the cause of justice.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9427480. Public record. Not legal advice.